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ABSTRACT 
Over the years Bonn and Berlin's policy and decision-makers adopted a 
pragmatic multilateral attitude that serves Germany's interests best. Today, 
Germany executes the concept of a civilian power. Supranationalism and 
institutional cooperation, followed by integration are the key ideas to formulate 
and represent power and national interests. 
As one of the largest industrial and trading nations, Germany is dependent 
upon a stable and well-functioning economic system that is committed to free 
trade relying largely on imported raw materials and energy - i.e. low-cost oil from 
the Middle East. 
In this context, German politics has an interesting and unique position. 
Germany's policy in the Middle East is somewhat ambiguous. The Federal 
Republic's dependency on oil inclines Germany toward the Arab states. The 
second factor is the historical moral burden bequeathed by the Third Reich that 
tends to tilt German diplomacy toward Israel. Germany's dilemma is its polarized 
Middle Eastern policy; German leadership carefully maintains a political neutral 
position keeping the country's economic interests in mind, along with 
considerations of an evenhanded approach toward the Middle' East. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In Germany's federalist democratic system, party politics, power exertion 
of interest groups and public opinion play a significant role not only in domestic 
politics, but also in foreign policy. Although the Federal Republic is a major 
economic power, it did not develop a strategic culture like France, Great Britain 
or the United States. The countries' political elite continues to point out that the 
Germans are seeking a post-national identity in the context of European 
integration and the Atlantic alliance. 
The process of German unification, in correlation with the unification of 
Europe, has a significant impact on German foreign policy. One distinguishing 
feature in its foreign policy tradition is the reluctance to define what Germany's 
national interests are. Some non-German observers argue that the Federal 
Republic has never conducted a sovereign foreign policy, nor a largely 
autonomous, truly national foreign policy. Some German leaders and German 
"think-tanks" view this as the "pragmatic multilateralists" approach to foreign 
policy, which serves Germany best in an increasingly interdependent world. 
Supranationalism and institutional cooperation, followed by integration are the 
key figures to formulate and represent power and national interests. 
Germany, as a civilian power and a large trading nation, but without its 
own resources, is dependent on imported raw materials and energy - i.e. low- 
cost oil of the Middle East. This dependency is one of the main explanations for 
Germany's Middle Eastern interests. 
xi 
It needs regional security and stability for the sake of its own political economy 
and for the safety of the governing regimes in the region. Throughout its post-war 
foreign policy, Germany established firm relations with the Arab states, mostly 
because of economic interests. The Arab states are the main supplier of oil and a 
primary concern in trade. The moral obligation to the State of Israel due to 
atrocities in the Third Reich, however, prevented an unambiguous policy defined 
by national interests. 
Nonetheless, the perception of the State of Israel is gradually changing; 
the images of the Holocaust are slowly fading away. Postwar generations do not 
like to be accused of or blamed for the atrocities as "collective guilt" occurring 
during the Third Reich. The younger-generation of politicians in both states are 
able to differentiate between the Holocaust and businesslike Realpolitik. 
Critiques of Israel's policy toward the Palestinians have nothing to do with anti- 
Semitism. German general policy is to fight violations of human rights and 
international law, including Israeli actions against the people in the West Bank 
and Gaza. The political implications of this new attitude on the Middle East could 
be that Germany's future leaders will be more focused on economic and other 
real interests rather than on an explicitly Israel-biased policy. How soon this will 
happen depends inter alias on Israel's politics. 
In the Middle East-North Africa region, Berlin uses its new foreign policy 
concept active economic presence to exert political influence. It distinguishes 
itself from former Foreign Minister Genschers "Scheckbuch Diplomatie" in such a 
way that Germany offers economic support only for political service in return. 
xii 
Even when Germany does not clearly expressed its national interests, in 
recent years, its evenhanded attitude in the Middle East has been appreciated in 
both conflicting parties: in the Arab states and in the PA as well as in Israel. It 
has for the most part also reached its aim - fulfilling the economic interests even 
when critics call it "muddling through". 
As a European country, the Federal Republic has to take a political stance 
in the MENA region because the challenges and risks related to this region can 
only be solved, or better said, can only be encountered in the European context. 
In sum, there might be some more small steps undertaken by the Federal 
Republic plainly expressing its national interests, but they will surely be 
embedded in the European network rather than formulated unilaterally. Germany 
will continue its multilateral, evenhanded attitude toward the Middle East, 
swinging between the moral obligation to the State of Israel and the security of its 
energy needs, while continuing to be reluctant in using military force and further 
pursuing its national and economic interests through a interrelated European and 
trans-Atlantic framework. 
XIII 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the Cold War, Germany has emerged, now reunified, as 
the state of central importance for the security of Eurasia. As East and West 
Germany jumped on the train of unification, sovereignty restrictions disappeared 
and the post-Second World War circumstances that made West Germany a 
Great Economical Power but a Political Minor Actor changed irrevocably. 
The National Security Advisor, Horst Teltschik expressed his opinion to 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl with the question: should (could) Germany join the 
western alliance and assist militarily against Iraq during the Gulf crisis in 1990- 
1991, when he said, 
The role that Germany is playing in the world has a new quality. The 
problem is that most Germans haven't recognized it yet. We must take 
more responsibility ourselves. The world expects more of us. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union has put Germany into a new 
situation, where it has to re-establish itself in the international system and to re- 
define its national interests. This applies globally as well as vis-ä-vis the Middle 
East. With unification Germany returned to full sovereignty. Berlin is no longer a 
divided city under Four-Power occupation status. 
1
 In this Thesis, I concentrate on West German policies. The impact of the East German legacy is 
very limited except for the changed geostrategic position after unification. 
2 Stephen Szabo, German Society and Foreign Policy, in Shahram Chubin (ed.), Germany and 
the Middle East, (St. Martin's Press 1992) pp. 94 and 100-101 
1 
This return to normalcy means that the political statute of limitations, which 
has applied to both German states, has finally ended. However, this does not 
mean that the political and strategic culture for a unified Germany will alter over 
night. 
This thesis explores Germany's foreign policy and its national interests 
toward the Middle East and describes that Germany's foreign policy in the Middle 
East as a cautious approach to protect its economic interests in export and 
markets. 
Supranationalism is the key figure in German foreign policy. With the 
process of reunification, Germany follows a path of deepening European 
integration. It pursues its national interests through a network of close alliances. 
Germany uses its growing freedom and influence in institutional cooperation to 
formulate and represent power and national interests. 
As one of the largest industrial and trading nations, Germany is dependent 
upon a stable and well-functioning economic system that is committed to free 
trade. As a large producer and the biggest exporter of manufacturing goods, but 
without its own sufficient resources, Germany has had to rely largely on imported 
3 
raw materials and energy - i.e. low-cost oil of the Middle East. In this context 
German politics has an interesting and unique position while its policy in the 
Middle East is somewhat ambiguous. 
3 
Hanns Maull, Economic relations with the Middle East, in Shahram Chubin (ed.), Germany and 
the Middle East, p. 115 
One big factor is Germany's dependency on oil, which pulls Germany toward 
the Arab states. The second factor, opposing to the first, is the historical moral 
burden bequeathed by the Third Reich that tends to tilt German diplomacy toward 
4 
Israel. 
In the past, Germany adopted a policy of multilateralism to outbalance its 
sovereignty limitations in security issues. The 'multilateral - institutional approach' 
served Germany well during the Cold War period and helped to postpone the taking 
up national positions. 
The patterns of much of Germany's post-WWII foreign and foreign economic 
policy emerged from its historical background. Germany had destroyed Europe's old 
order and killed some six million Jews. The Western allies, especially the United 
States, made West Germany a client and used it as a buffer toward the Soviet 
Union. Based on this foundation, Germany was unable to pursue an independent 
Middle East policy in the sense of a Great or Medium Power. 
But, because of the dramatic changes in the political environment, which 
happened in the early 1990s, Germany must assume new international 
responsibility. With its political and economical strength it has to make a 
contribution to the resolution of future problems throughout the world. 
4 
Josef Joffe, Reflections on German policy in the Middle East, in Shahram Chubin (ed.), 
Germany and the Middle East, p. 195 
5 
Wolfgang Schloer, German Security Policy, (Adelphi Paper 277; The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 1993), pp. 3-4 
6Maull,p. 114 
The radical changes in Germany's security environment changed and 
improved its strategic situation. The risk of a major war in Europe has been 
replaced by a multitude of risk factors with a variety of regional manifestations. 
The Middle East was not and is not the most important area of German 
interests. East - West European matters and NATO concerns take priority. But 
because of its economic power and political weight, Germany has to take on 
major responsibility in bilateral relations with nations in the Middle East as well as 
responsibilities as a leading nation in the European Community's (EC) policy 
toward the Middle East. 
The Middle East region, with the Mediterranean as a bridge, is an area of 
increased political and security interest to Europe and Germany. The 
demographic factor, political instability and a growing gap in living standards will 
promote growing tension between Christian Europe and the Muslim countries of 
8 
the Middle East. The proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapon will increase 
Germany's perception that a threat exists. Even though Germany's oil imports 
from the Middle East decreased by 86.5 percent in the period 1970 to the early 
9 
1990s , the growing German economy will continue to depend on Middle Eastern 
oil; this issue will remain a vital national interest. 
7 
White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future 
of the Bundeswehr, (Federal Ministry of Defense 1994), pp. 24-25 
8 
Szabo, p. 93 
9 
1974 was the peak year with 57.2 million tons; import decreased to a low in 1985 (7.7 million), 
see Maull, p. 121 
Germany's role in the Middle East is of special interest to local states. In a 
more decentralized world with multi-polar power centers, the involvement of a 
state with the weight of an economic superpower will be welcomed and sought. 
Yet the Middle East will remain an area of primary concern to Germany and 
Europe, whether for reasons of proximity, demography, energy or trade and 
10 
markets. 
Germany's political encounter in the Middle East is a cautious approach. 
German policy towards the Middle East in the recent past has been defined in 
economic rather than political terms and has generally been characterized by the 
kind of commercialistic opportunism most evident in the area of arms and 
technology transfers. Critics on this behavior would say that (1) the German 
leadership ignores the massive consequences of their worldwide economical 
activities and (2) Germany ignores security considerations because of its high 
economic interests. One example is the transfer of technology to Iraq, which 
enabled Iraq to build an extensive chemical weapons program with upgrading 
Iraq's Scud surface-to-surface missile system. 
The attitude of Germany toward the Middle East is a kind of balancing-act 
between a historical pro-Israeli stand and a more economical dominated pro- 
Arab position. As a result a great deal of credit and respect is given by the Arab 
states toward Germany. 
10 
Chubin, p. 2 
11
 Ibid., p. 9 
Germany could use this as a fundament for more conscientious policies, 
designed by emancipated national interests rather than narrowed economically- 
dominated big-business interests. The Arab states, Germany's traditionally good 
economic partners in the Middle East, are trying to increasingly engage 
Germany, as one of the leading nations within the EC, into the Middle East 
conflict in order to outbalance the United States' hegemonic stand in the region. 
The Arab states lost trust (if they ever had any) in the United States as the 
mediator in the Arab - Israeli peace process. 
The Arab states would like to see Germany and the EC more involved in 
Middle Eastern politics. A unified Germany is the dominant state in Europe and a 
united Europe is likely to become a leading power internationally with an 
important role to play in the Middle East. The European problem, however, 
interrelated with the Middle East Peace Process is that no clearly identifiable 
European position yet exists. Every European nation has its own political and 
economical stand towards the Middle East. The European Union (EU) countries 
still compete among themselves for influence and access to markets and for 
lucrative arms contracts. This might change when a united Europe evolves and a 
consensus about European foreign policy toward the Middle East is developed. 
Chapter II documents the basic determinants of German foreign policy. As 
a great economic power in Central Europe, Germany did not step on the train of 
nationalism and unilateral political actions. 
Germany pursues its national interests through a multilateral framework, a 
network of interdependent institutions and supranational organizations. 
Chapter III discusses Germany's interests and objectives in the Middle 
12 East, especially in the MENA region. Its relations with the Middle East are 
largely shaped by history and by the abundance of low-cost oil. Germany's 
industrial strength has to rely on the energy provided by the Arab states. 
Therefore, Germany's approach to the Middle East is an act of balance between 
Israel, to which Germany has moral obligations, and to the Arab states, which are 
traditional welcomed trade partners. 
Chapter IV analyzes Germany's relation with the state of Israel more in 
depth. The main argument is that German and the State of Israel have a special 
and unique relationship based on the atrocities, which occurred in the Third 
Reich. Shadows of the genocide are still hanging over both states and societies, 
influencing the behavior of decision and policy makers in both nations toward 
each other. 
The process of European unification is one of the biggest determinants 
Germany's leadership has to deal with today. Chapter V analyzes Germany's 
policy toward the Middle East through the network of European institutions and 
organizations. 
12 
MENA region: The Middle Eastern North African countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea 
7 
A unified Europe is likely to become a leading power internationally with an 
important role to play in the Middle East. Germany, as the dominant nation in 
Europe, has to take a solid stand within a common European foreign policy to 
pursue its national interests. 
This thesis concludes with an assessment of Germany's encounter in the 
Middle East and a prediction of Germany's political and economical policies 
toward this area of primary concern in world politics. 
8 
II. BASIC DETERMINANTS OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLITICS 
Germany, today, is one of the wealthiest and one of the most culturally 
influential countries in the world. It is surrounded by friendly democratic states, 
the third largest economy in the world, the second most active exporter, and the 
biggest country west of Russia in Europe. The .German economy is successfully 
extending around the globe. Finally, Germany's global trade and investment have 
linked the country's welfare with the security and prosperity of world markets. 
These achievements are alone partially attributed to German politics and 
its foreign policy. Additionally, it is important to note that its consolidated 
democracy has been strengthened by both its close relations with the United 
States, following the Second World War (WWII) and its prospering economy. 
Garton Ash, a British observer of German history and politics has noted that the 
old Federal Republic: 
...has over the last 30 years pursued one of the most consistent 
foreign policies of any Western power. As a result, it has a well- 
formed foreign policy tradition. This tradition, a blend of 
Adenauerrian Westpolitik and Brandtian Ostpolitik, has several 
distinctive features. Besides the renunciation of force and the 
pursuit of reconciliation with former foes, there is what one might 
call attritional multilateralism. German diplomacy has excelled at 
the patient, discreet pursuit of national goals through multilateral 
institutions and negotiations, whether in the European Community, 
13 NATO, or the Helsinki process. 
13 
Timothy Garton Ash, Germany's Choice, in Foreign Affairs - 73 (1994), p. 71 
Throughout the fifty-year history of the Federal Republic, its foreign policy aims - 
security, political and economic reconstruction in the context of Europe and the 
North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and reunification - have remained 
constant even though they have been modified in the light to changes in 
14 
international and domestic politics. 
A.       ADENAUER'S POLITICS OF STRENGTH 
The central element of German foreign policy in the first phase following 
WWII was the country's division and the building of trust and credibility. A 
shattered economy and few, if any, friends subordinated the postwar leadership 
under the Adenauer - Erhard governments to the overriding requirements of 
political rehabilitation and economic recovery.15 
For Adenauer and his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) administration it 
was clear that Germany's re-establishment in world politics in the long-run 
depended on the successful completion of two main tasks: (1) the integration of 
Germany in an American - led Western security framework (2) the creation of a 
prospering social market economy. To complete the first task, the Federal 
Republic was constrained in its political freedom in order to deter the Soviet 
Union and to demonstrate its solidarity with its new Western partners. 
14 
Wolfram F. Hanrieder (ed.), West German Foreign Policy, 1949 - 1979: Necessities and 
Choices, (Westview Press 1980), p. 15 
15
 Ibid., p. 13 
10 
The successful rebuilding of Germany's economy was a necessity for the 
establishment and for the support of the Federal Republic's new democratic 
16 
institutions. The result was new democratic leaders preoccupied with either 
domestic and economic issues or exclusively focused on Central Europe, 
struggling for security building and legitimacy. 
West Germany became closely integrated with the West in such 
supranational organizations as the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the NATO military alliance. Within NATO, the Federal Republic was content to 
play the role of a junior partner to the United States, whose enormous military 
power served as a protection from Soviet threats. .Adenauer's "politics of 
strength" and Eisenhower administration's policy of containment solidified the 
Cold War alliances in Central Europe and further deepened the division of 
Germany. 
In the 1950s West Germany's relations with the communist regime of East 
Germany became severed after Chancellor Adenauer claimed that all Germans 
were one nation and that West Germany was the only legal successor to the 
Third Reich (Hallstein Doctrine). Bonn and East Berlin subsequently engaged in 
a worldwide struggle for political legitimacy. 
16
 Ibid., p, 14 
17 
The Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany's leadership announced that it would only establish 
diplomatic relations with those governments that decline to recognize the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), see Richard Burt, Germany and world politics, in Sharam Chubin (ed.), 
Germany and the Middle East, (St. Martins Press New York 1992), p. 14 
11 
In the Middle East, the Adenauer administration started an early support 
for the survivors of the Holocaust and for the newly emerged State of Israel. This 
political and moral obligation was an important element of Germany's 
rehabilitation. Nevertheless, Germany pursued the same low level engagement in 
the Middle East that it followed elsewhere in the first postwar period. 
B.       OSTPOLITIK AND DETENTE 
The second phase of postwar foreign policy began in the late 1960's under 
Chancellor Brandt's Social Democratic Party (SPD) government with Bonn 
opening to the East. Brandt's Ostpolitik (politics to the East) succeeded in 
strategic - political and economic terms. It also reflected the interaction between 
domestic and foreign policy. The emerging primacy of economic and monetary 
matters in global economic relations significantly increased Germany's influence 
and power in Europe and the world. In Brandt's Ostpolitik it became obvious that 
economic and monetary interdependence is a measure of power, which is, in 
given appropriate circumstances, more relevant than military capacity. Economic 
18 power is also a much more flexible instrument of diplomacy than military power. 
18 
Hanrieder, p. 27 
12 
The Brandt administration realized that a general rapprochement with the 
East, especially the Soviet Union, required a formal recognition of East Germany 
as the second German state, the Oder - Neisse line and the territorial and 
political status quo in Eastern and Central Europe. This fundamental shift in the 
Federal Republic's politics concerning the "German Question" was on the one 
hand, a policy of resignation because it ignores Germany's primary concern - 
reunification. On the other hand, however, the fundamental shift gave Bonn a 
considerable leverage in its policy toward Moscow and, thereby, strengthened 
19 
the impact of German politics in East Europe. 
In the wake of the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle), Germany's 
social market economy expanded into the world. Its economic interests and its 
20 political obligation had become a global significance. With its commitment to 
economic liberalism and its underpinning logic that economics is the vehicle to 
obtain political objectives, Germany developed itself into an economic world 
power. 
C.       NEW ASSERTIVENESS AND PRE-UNIFICATION POLICY 
In the 1970's the Federal Republic, under Chancellor Schmidt (SPD) 
became mature in the fields of economy and politics. Schmidt succeeded in 
changing the character of the American - German security dialogue. 
19
 Ibid., pp. 28-29 
20 
Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Germany and the Third World, in Wolfram F. Hanrieder (ed.), West 
German Foreign Policy, 1949 - 1979: Necessities and Choices, (Westview Press 1980), p.182 
13 
He argued that Bonn was becoming less of a client and more of a partner for 
Washington. Schmidt represented the new confidence and a new German 
21 
assertiveness in world affairs. 
Bonn's new influence was supported by the development and introduction 
of the economic summits, the annual meetings of the Group of Seven (G-7) 
industrialized countries, recognizing the growing multipolarity of international 
economic power. The economic summits gave Germany (with Japan) a seat at 
the "top table", dealing with world affairs for the first time in its postwar period. 
Schmidt's successor, Helmut Kohl (CDU), continued the process of 
expanding the Federal Republic's international horizons, while increasing Bonn's 
influence on the European continent. It was during the 1980's that Bonn began to 
rival with Paris and London for the hegemonic position in Europe. Germany's 
continuing prospering economy made it the key European player in the G-7 
meetings. At the same time, Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher took an 
active and forward posture toward the Soviet Union, which represented 
Germany's new influence and assertiveness in security issues and in NATO. 
The most important issue, however, was Kohl's prudent management of 
the Bonn - Washington relationship. He realized that American support was vital 
for Germany's political rehabilitation. To become mature it was necessary to have 
22 
the United States' trust and confidence. 
Burt, p. 15 
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D.       FOREIGN POLITICS IN A NEW ERA; A TRADING NATION AND A 
CIVILIAN POWER 
During the East - West conflict, Germany faced the threat of a large-scale 
aggression, which resulted from a combination of expansionist Soviet policies 
and its superiority in military quantity of the Warsaw Pact. The two world powers 
faced each other militarily on German soil. This danger of threatening the state's 
existence has now been banished. The radical historic events, following the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union changed the political order and the security 
landscape in Central and Eastern Europe. Its unity and the process of European 
unification fundamentally improved the political and security situation for 
Germany. It has gained a tremendous amount from the revolutionary political 
changes in Europe. Germany has achieved its unity with the approval of all its 
neighbors and the world's great powers, and returned to full sovereignty.23 At the 
same time, Germany challenges new international responsibility. With its political 
and economic strength, Germany has a key role to play in the development of 
European structures and it has to contribute to the resolution of coming problems 
throughout the world. 
After forty-five years of forced division the most significant change for 
Germany was the reunification itself. There are no longer West and East German 
polities and policies but only one German polity and policy. 
23 White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future 
of the Bundeswehr, (Federal Ministry of Defense 1994), p. 24 
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With unification Germany returned to full sovereignty. Berlin is no longer a 
divided city under Four-Power occupation status. This return to normalcy means 
that the political statute of limitations, which has applied to both German states 
has finally ended. However, this does not mean that the political and strategic 
culture for a unified Germany will alter overnight. Josef Joffe describes the basic 
understanding of contemporary German foreign policy as follows: 
...if you look at this century, then two lessons are almost genetically 
imprinted on you. Whenever Germany tried to go alone, it reaped 
ever larger disaster, this is World War I, World War II. And when 
Germany, as [it did] after World War II, pursued its interests in 
community and multilaterally in international organizations such as 
NATO and the EU, it flourished beyond belief. And I think together 
those   two   historical    lessons   can    explain   about   90%   of 
contemporary German foreign policy. 
One distinguishing feature of Germany's foreign policy tradition is its reluctance 
to define clearly what Germany's national interests are. Some non-German 
observers argue that the Federal Republic has never conducted a sovereign 
25 
foreign policy, nor a largely autonomous truly national foreign policy. Some 
German leaders and German "think-tanks" view this as the "pragmatic 
multilateralists" approach to foreign policy, which serves Germany best in an 
increased interdependent world. 
24 
Interview with Josef Joffe (co-editor 'Die Zeit') done by Harry Kreisler of the Institute of 
International Studies (Berkeley University), March 23 2000, available online 
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25 Günther Hellmann, Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany, in 
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Hanns W. Maull, Professor of International Relations at the University of 
Trier, Germany analyzes the country's embedding in a wider world: 
If it is to serve German interests, Germany's new foreign policy can 
only be conducted against the reality of the diverse regional and 
global interdependencies which connect the German society, 
economy and polity with the external world and which create ties 
rendering partnership with others a  precondition of successful 
German foreign policy. 
This "Einbindungspolitik" (politics of integration) turned out to be a more 
successful cost-efficient strategy in the Federal Republic's first fifty years than a 
strategy solely based on national interests. The changing environment after 1990 
reinforced this "recipe of successful foreign policy", i.e. Germany continued the 
multilateralists approach after unification. The underpinning logic is that a 
destabilized multi-polarized world with increased transnational 
interconnectedness demands multilateral regulation. A unilateralist foreign policy 
for Germany, as a non-nuclear middle power, is considered neither wise nor 
materially possible, as well as politically counterproductive. 
After unification, Germany now significantly larger and potentially more 
powerful than before, might be tempted to embark on a unilateral course and 
disembark from European integration. 
27 
Hanns W. Maull und Karl Kaiser (ed.), Die Suche nach Kontinuitaeten in einer Welt des 
Wandels,-in Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik - Band I: Grundlagen, (Oldenbourg Verlag 1994), 
pp. xv-xxv 
28 
Hellmann, pp. 6 and 9 
17 
In contradiction to these fears expressed by some of Germany's European allies, 
Germany continued its policy of integration with even extra steps to reaffirm its 
29 
commitment to the European cause. 
The impact of domestic politics and public opinion on foreign policies is 
significant in democratic regimes; this is especially true for Germany. Public- 
opinion polls in the aftermath of the re-unification drew a picture of an introverted 
country with great concern for the environment but with less attention to greater 
30 
responsibility in the international system. 
Bonn's and Berlin's reluctance to play an active political role in the Middle 
East, in comparison to London and Paris, is, therefore, no surprise. Since WWII, 
Germany has kept a low profile toward the region. Whenever the German 
governments tried to change this and searched for an active stance in one of the 
region's conflicts, it experienced trouble domestically and internationally. 
Examples of this are Chancellor Erhard's decision to exchange ambassadors and 
start diplomatic relations in May 1965 with Israel, thereby hampering Bonn's 
relations with the Arab states; 
29 
Schloer, p. 26 
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Chancellor Schmidt's attempt to sell tanks to Saudi Arabia between 1980-2, 
which was prevented by a domestic pro-Israeli coalition with support of anti-arms 
31 
export groups; and the 1990-91 Gulf War, when Chancellor Kohl stated early in 
the crisis that he was willing to send naval troops to the Gulf in support of the 
U.S.-led Western alliance against Iraq. This was prevented by the SPD- 
opposition in the Bundestag (German Parliament), who argued that "out-of-area" 
deployments of German armed forces are against German Basic Law. 
Throughout its post-war foreign policy, Germany established firm relations 
with the Arab states, mostly because of economic interests. The Arab states are 
the main supplier of oil and a primary concern in trade. The moral obligation to 
the State of Israel due to atrocities in the Third Reich, however, prevented an 
unambiguous policy defined by national interests. This explains Germany's 
dilemma in its polarized Middle Eastern policy; German leadership carefully 
maintains a political neutral position with considerations of an "evenhanded 
approach" toward the Middle East. 
31 
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III.     GERMAN POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST - NORTH 
AFRICA REGION 
The Federal Republic and the GDR were both integral parts of the 
international system in the Cold War period. German re-unification and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union forced this period to an end. The process of 
German unification, in correlation with the unification of Europe, has a significant 
impact on German foreign policy. Having these interrelated processes in mind, 
what are the consequences for Germany's attitudes toward the Middle East or be 
more precisely, toward the Middle East - North Africa (MENA) region? 
In the latest Gulf crisis, Germany was caught up in their own history, 
preventing it from having an independent Middle Eastern policy. This event, 
which happened shortly after reunification, also showed that Germany was not 
yet ready for a new political or strategic culture. German leadership was 
preoccupied with the challenge of the political and economic reconstruction of 
East Germany and very limited in their political actions toward the Middle Eastern 
crisis because political opposition and public opinion objected to any decisive 
"move". 
Chancellor Kohl indicated very early in the conflict that he was willing to 
send troops to the Gulf to assist the Western alliance against Iraq. He and his 
Christian Democrats argued that Germany should support the United States in 
gratitude for Americans backing the German unification. 
21 
Their coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP; or the Liberal Party), 
continued to argue that the Basic Law forbade any deployments outside of the 
NATO treaty area, but agreed to a change of the Constitution allowing German 
troops to participate in future UN peacekeeping missions.32 The opposition led by 
the Social Democrats rejected in principle German participation in this crisis. 
They even argued against participation in UN peacekeeping missions saying that 
every military missions of the Bundeswehr outside the Alliance's sphere of 
influence is constitutionally inadmissible.33 Only after the German Constitutional 
Court pronounced a judgment in July 1994 and the Bundestag finally voted with a 
two-third majority for a change of the Constitution, were the so-called 'out-of- 
area' deployments allowed. 
Germany, as a "civilian power" and a large trading nation, but without its 
own sufficient resources, is dependent on imported raw materials and energy - 
i.e. low-cost oil of the Middle East. This dependency is one of the main 
explanations for Germany's Middle Eastern interests. It needs regional security 
and stability for the sake of its own political economy and for the safety of the 
governing regimes in the region. 
32 Szabo, pp. 101-02 
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Germany and the other European countries also have a strong interest in 
containing the development of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and in their 
delivery means. 
Besides the energy and military security issue, demographics is a third 
great factor shaping German policy toward the region. Since the recessions in 
the late 1970s, the influx of 'Guest Workers' into Germany has intensified. 
Germany became a haven for political and economic refugees from Asia, Africa 
and the Middle East. Today, some five million foreign workers live in Germany, 
putting strains on the society. In conjunction with the relatively high 
unemployment rate (a cost of unification), an anti-foreign sentiment developed 
that is directed especially against Moslems from Turkey and multi-ethnic 
refugees from Africa.34 Germany, given the present economic stage, can not 
afford to take much more foreign workers. Concerns about the development of 
the political economies in the MENA region are therefore a crucial political issue. 
A.       CHALLENGES AND RISKS 
Following the East - West antagonism, Germany faces new challenges on 
Europe's periphery, which are regional crises and the possibility of explosive 
r 
conflicts. Their spectrum ranges from domestic social, ethnic, religious and 
economic crisis to inter - state rivalries. 
^Szabo, p. 103 
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In an interdependent world, all states are vulnerable: less developed 
countries (LDC) as well as highly developed industrial countries. There is an 
indissoluble link between domestic stability in politics, the economy and the 
society as well as stability in a broader international setting.35 
For Germany and Europe, the Mediterranean is of central importance as a 
major trade route to the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. 
Developments in this region, therefore, play a great role for the security and 
stability of Europe as a whole. The political economies in the Middle East are 
confronted with regional power ambitions, different degrees of economic and 
social development, religious and ethnic conflicts and a shortage of resources, 
especially water. Combined these with the military arms build-up in the region, it 
is forming a potential problem that might become a threat to the security of all 
European countries, including Germany. In this context, Germany's concerns are, 
to a certain extent, affected by military risks, but to a much greater extent by the 
dangerous impact that the developments have on the economies in this region.36 
The dependence on raw materials, migratory movements, free trade 
relations, the increasing indebtedness of the economies of the Middle East as 
well as the interdependence of the financial markets are all factors that could 
interfere with the economic and social structure of Germany. 
35
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1.     Energy Security 
Approximately 70 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and more than 
40 percent of its natural gas reserves lie in an area called 'the Greater Middle 
East'. The fast growing energy needs of Asia, including China and India, compete 
with the United States and Germany for Middle Eastern energy supplies. This 
leads to significant changes in the patterns of politics and security relationships 
that have evolved since the energy crisis of the late 1970s, early 1980s and the 
1990-91 Gulf War. In the Middle East there is enough oil in the ground to meet 
global demands into the indefinite future. The problem is getting the oil out of the 
ground and distributing it to the world market at an acceptable price. The 
obstacle is less geological or technological; it is rather a political, economic or 
logistic question, which arises in terms of access to the resources.37 
Germany, in conjunction with other European countries, is more 
dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the United States. Quite likely this will 
increase, especially because of the growing needs in Germany's Eastern part 
plus the demands of the newly industrializing countries of Eastern Europe. In 
1992, more than 25 percent of the total Middle East oil production went to the 
European continent. It is estimated that in 2010, eight million barrels a day will be 
exported from the Middle East to Europe, while 4.4 million barrels a day will go to 
the United States.38 
37
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In 1999 Germany imported 31.6 million tons of crude oil from the MENA 
region. This was a reduction of 3.2 percent in relation to 1998, however, because 
of the higher oil price the value increased by 35.7 percent, in total 7.6 billion 
Deutschmark (DM; some $3.6 billion).39 
The dependence on Middle Eastern energy sources has a major impact 
on the political and economic relationships, both within the countries of the region 
as well as between Germany and its 'fellow' European countries. For the oil 
producing countries in the region it is vital but very unlikely that the revenues 
these countries collect from oil export meet the domestic "demands", i.e. achieve 
social and political stability - "keep the people quiet and the regime in power". 
The resulting consequences might be unrest and turmoil, which would not only 
shake the regimes in the region, but also have a great impact on European and 
German energy security concerns. 
2.     Demographics 
Demographers predict that the population of the Middle East will increase 
from some 174 million in 1995 to some 500 million in 2025. In Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Syria and the West Bank and Gaza it is expected that the 
population will more than double by 2025.40 
39
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Many countries in the region are experiencing enormous strains on social 
services as a result of rapid population growth. In areas such as education, labor, 
housing, health services and basic food supplies, many governments are unable 
to adequately meet the needs of their people.41 With modern communications, 
especially television, the people and citizens of the Middle Eastern countries are 
becoming aware of their relatively low quality of life compared with other nations 
in the world, which subsequently leads to frustration and unrest. These continued 
failings of regional regimes result in cross-border migration, including labor 
migration and the spillover of population problems from one country to the next 
as well as to the North beyond the Mediterranean. 
The numerous economic and social problems derivative of overpopulation 
and economic poverty, particularly in the North African countries are building 
pressure in the Mediterranean countries of France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 
and further into Central Europe. Illegal immigration resulting from this pressure is 
already creating social tensions and economic concerns within Europe. 
Germany, on one hand, has to be more reliant upon foreign labor to 
outbalance its aging population. On the other hand the already high number of 
foreigners in Germany's society has created a resentment, centered in the lower- 
middle class and the working class in large cities with big foreign population.42 
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With the implementation of the Schengen Agreement43 Germany nearly 
becomes a country situated at the "Mediterranean's Northern coast", thus being 
well open to the influx of immigrants across the Mediterranean. 
The arena of ethnic and religious conflicts constitutes another threat to 
stability as it stifles efforts to achieve democratic governance and a more open, 
liberal, secular environment in the Middle East. Militant extremists are willing to 
use violence and terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism has risen in Algeria and 
Egypt and is spreading, a threat not only to domestic political stability, but also to 
a broader "across and beyond the Mediterranean security".44 
From the German perspective, it is not national security in a conventional 
sense that affects its security concerns. It is rather the security of German and 
European democratic polities and the well - being and civic order of its societies 
that are affected by regional domestic instability, due to the economic and social 
underdevelopment in almost all authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. In 
addition, criminal spill-over effects and drug trafficking is another major concern 
of German politics in the MENA region. 
43
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3.     Military Potentials 
The long-lasting Arab - Israeli conflict has led to an excessive growth of 
armaments and a 'military machine' that is out of proportion in the region. During 
the past 20 years, annual military spending as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) has been on an average: 
• About 15 percent for Egypt and Syria 
• About 17 percent for Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq 
• About 20 percent for Israel45 
Particularly worrisome are the numerous efforts to attain advanced missile 
technology and weapon of mass destruction (WMD) arsenals. The two gulf wars 
have proven that long-range ballistic missiles have both a military and a political 
value. But even with these high figures in military spending, a consensus exists 
between Germany and its European neighbors that no MENA country is capable 
of conducting a full military attack on the European continent (with the exception 
of Turkey with respect to Syria); • such a threat has not been taken into 
consideration. The perception of military challenges and risks in Europe deals 
primarily with the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means.46 
Some countries in the Middle East have developed military technology that 
threatens their neighbors and also impacts Germany's security concerns. 
45
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India, Pakistan and Israel have effectively established nuclear weapons. In 
Berlin, the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) recently issued a report 
saying that Iraq is pushing ahead with plans to make a nuclear bomb, within the 
next three years. The BND report also said that Iraq, with the aid of a company 
based in New Delhi, is building a medium-range rocket capable of carrying a 
warhead 3,000 kilometers by 2005, reaching European's Southern borders. 
Iraq is also believed to be capable of manufacturing solid fuel, which 
would drastically cut down the time needed to launch to almost the push of a 
button. The BND also concluded that Iraq is putting a great deal of effort into 
making chemical weapons while it has increased the number of sites from 20 to 
80. It also speculated that Iraq has resumed production of biological weapons.47 
The potential proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and 
conventional weapons threatens security and stability in the Mediterranean - 
Middle Eastern area, but yet this is less of a threat than a risk for Germany; its 
effects are more diplomatic and political than characteristically military. A 
comprehensive arms control agreement with an effective verification regime 
should, from the German perspective, be included in a peace treaty in order to 
achieve durable stability and peace for the entire region. 
47
 Die Welt (daily German newspaper), available online 
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However, the problem with arms control agreements is that only 
democratic states with a system of "checks-and-balances" allow reliable controls. 
Israel is the only consolidated democratic state in the Middle East, while all other 
states have authoritarian regimes who are unstable and more or less insecure. 
B.       FOREIGN   POLICY   IN   THE   CONTEXT   OF   THE   ARAB-   ISRAELI 
CONFLICT 
1.    West German Foreign Policy and the Arab - Israeli Conflict 
The patterns of much of Germany's post-WWII foreign policy and foreign 
economic policy emerged from this historical background. Bound to its Western 
partner, the United States, and directly influenced by the consequences of the 
Second World War and the subsequently following Cold War period, West 
Germany was limited to pursue unilateral national interests and unable to pursue 
an independent Middle Eastern foreign policy. The complicating factor in this 
context was and still is the historical legacy to the State of Israel. Without that 
moral obligation, German foreign policy could have been directed toward fulfilling 
its vital interests, i.e. first and foremost energy security. 
Many Arab leaders regarded West Germany, the former adversary of the 
colonial powers in the Middle East and a traditional and cultural partner, as a 
"natural ally". The Arab idea is that Germany and the Arab states together were 
fighting the same enemy: colonialism, imperialism and Zionism. 
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Their notions were that the Germans hate the Jews, like the Arabs do. 48 Thus 
the Arab states were among the first who established diplomatic relations with 
West Germany in 1951. 
The Arab state were vigorously opposed to and irritated by West 
Germany's large restitution payments to Israel. However, many of the Arabs 
thought that this agreement with Israel was forced on the Federal Government by 
the "western imperialists" and against the real wishes and interests of the 
German people.49 They were, further more quite furious when they heard about 
secret West German arms deliveries to Israel.50 In 1965, ten of the then thirteen 
Arab states severed diplomatic relations with Bonn. In 1969 many of these states 
recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a second German state, 
a clear breakdown of West Germany's "Alleinvertretungsanspruch" (Hallstein 
Doctrine; Bonn declared to be the only legal successor to the Third Reich). Bonn 
continued to adhere to the Hallstein Doctrine of breaking relations with any state, 
except the Soviet Union, which recognized the East German regime.51 
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During the Suez-crisis in 1956, Bonn was more concerned about the 
Soviet intervention in Hungary than with the Middle Eastern crisis itself. However, 
this event confirmed Israel's role as a source of potential conflict in the 
formulation of West German foreign policy. The U.S. Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles initiated an intense public debate about imposing certain sanctions 
against Israel because Israel refused to withdraw from the territory it had 
conquered in the Sinai campaign. Chancellor Adenauer argued that Germany 
would adhere to its obligations of the restitution agreement and not impose any 
sanctions against Israel. He viewed Israel's occupation as a transitory issue 
(Tagespolitik) and Germany's obligation as a fundamental issue 
(Geschichtspolitik).52 
During the Six Day War in 1967, West Germans sentiments continued to 
be basically pro-Israeli53 (in the German society the perception of the fight of 
"David against Goliath" existed), while Bonn officially declared neutrality. 
Although Bonn declared 'strict neutrality' in the 1973 war, it became involved 
because the United States re-supplied Israel with weapons stored on West 
German soil.54 
52Wo!ffsohn, pp. 21-22 
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Of interest that Chancellor Brandt and his Foreign Minister Scheel closed 
German ports to American re-supply deliveries only as it became obvious that 
Israel would win the war.55 
The great shift in Bonn's diplomacy toward a more "evenhanded 
approach" (Ausgewogenheit) happened in the 1970s because of the oil crisis. 
Like other industrialized countries, Germany was shaken by the surprised use of 
oil as a political weapon by the Arab states. Together with the United States and 
other West European countries, West Germany joined the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) in order to counteract the Organization Petroleum Exporting 
Countries' (OPEC) cartel by joint consumer action.56 
Most West Germans supported a foreign policy, which pursues its goals 
through bilateral or multilateral cooperation with other nations or via international 
institutions like NATO, EC and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE).57 The European Political Cooperation (EPC), the foreign policy 
instrument among the members of the European Community (established in 
1969), tried to demonstrate a more active posture toward the economical and 
political challenges from the Middle Eastern region. 
Israel's war in Lebanon, 1982, occurred without any German diplomatic 
reaction. However, this war shifted Germany's general perceptions of Israel and 
the Palestinians. 
55Wolffsohn, p. 30 
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For Bonn, it was now obvious that the "David" of 1967 has become the 
"Goliath".58 The Jewish state was no longer fighting for existence; Israel now was 
acting like a regional super-power nation. 
2.    The "other" Germany and the Middle East 
The Second World War division resulted in two different German states 
with two principally opposed Middle Eastern policies. The German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) fought in the 1950s for a primary policy goal - gain legitimacy. 
For the Middle East, East Berlin (capitol of the GDR) did not establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel. Unlike West Germany, communist officials never 
admitted any responsibility for German atrocities against the Jews. 59 The 
Communist leadership maintained that since the GDR was a socialist state it was 
liberated from Hitler and was consequently not responsible for the crimes of 
fascism. 
The GDR supported Israel's Arab enemies in close accordance with the 
policy of the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact.60 East 
Germany's relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
developed from the early 1970s. The GDR made sure to balance its contacts with 
the PLO, it developed relations with other Arab states, Syria, Iraq and Libya. 
58
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In 1985 the new Soviet leadership under Gorbachev opened dialogue with 
Israel following by Hungary and Poland, but the East German regime did not 
follow. Not until after the "November revolution" in 1989 did the new democratic 
government decide engage in relations with Israel and talk about material 
compensation for the "victims of Fascism". 
On 12 April 1990, the East German parliament passed a resolution in 
which it asked "the Jews of the world to forgive us".61 A few weeks later it started 
negotiations with Israel on establishing diplomatic relations, however, there was 
no official comment on the PLO or the Arab states. 
3.     The New Strategic Culture in Unified Germany in Regard to the 
Middle East 
Germany's orientation toward international cooperation and its restricted 
attitude toward the definition of national interests, in the sense of a traditional 
power, requires domestic consensus to some extent among all major political 
players.62 The institutions involved in the foreign policy and decision-making 
process are first and foremost the Foreign Office (Auswaertige Amt, AA), 
followed by the Chancellery (Kanzleramt), the Ministry of Defense (MOD; 
Bundesministerium fuer Verteidigung, BMV), 
61
 'We fee! sad and ashamed and acknowledge this burden of German history". International 
Herald Tribune, April 13 1990 
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 Risse-Kappen, p. 179 
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the Ministry of Economics (Bundesministerium fuer Wirtschaft und Technologie, 
BMWi) and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(Bundesministerium fuer Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, 
BMWZ). 
The Foreign Office with support of the Ministry of Economics usually takes 
a more pro-Arab position rather than the Chancellery does.63 The Chancellors 
and their diplomats are more concerned about a smooth Berlin - Tel Aviv 
(Jerusalem) relationship, while other agencies have basically the larger, the more 
economic Middle Eastern interests in mind. 
The political institutions carrying out German policies toward the Arab - 
Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question act in accordance with diverging 
societal demands. In the context of the Arab - Israeli conflict, the German 
government is trying to square the circle. On the one hand it tries to ensure 
Israel's security and fulfilling Tel Aviv's safety requirements and on the other 
hand the German industry exerts its influence on German leadership desiring to 
continue the good economic relationship with the Arab states by selling arms and 
goods to these countries. Interrelated with the latter argument is the fact that 
since German leadership claimed self-determination for all Germans, it could not 
refuse this right to the Palestinians.64 
An active network of transnational relations explains the considerable pro- 
Israeli attitude, which is present in Germany's society. 
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A close Christian - Jewish dialogue and a firm relationship between the 
Federation of German Trade Unions and the "Histradut"65 are the two most 
important social "players" in this context. The transnational German - Israeli 
organizations exert some domestic power over Germany's Middle Eastern policy. 
When comparing the extensive relations between Germany and Israel, the 
political and social contacts with the Arab states are rather limited. However, the 
weak social interactions are counterbalanced by the considerable German 
business interests in the region, particularly in the oil-producing countries. The 
German Mechanical Engineering Trade Association (Verein Deutscher 
Maschinenbauanstalten) and the Near and Middle East Association (Nah und 
Mittelost Verein) are the most important trade associations, specifically, directed 
toward the Middle East that is working under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Economics on issues of economic policy.66 Keeping in mind the dependence of 
foreign resources and the remarkable investments of German companies in the 
Arab world one could say that economic relations with the Middle East weigh 
heavily on policy decisions. 
In Germany, party politics, power exerted by interest groups and public 
opinion play a significant role in the federalist democratic system not only in 
domestic politics, but also in foreign policy. Although the Federal Republic is a 
major economic power, it has not developed strategic thinking like France, Great 
Britain or the United States. 
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The countries' political elite continues to point out that the Germans are 
seeking a post-national identity in the context of European integration and the 
Atlantic alliance. The language most used by these diplomats is "multilateralism" 
and "integration", rather than 'geopolitics' and "Machtpolitik" (military power).67 
The ties with the United States are still strong and firm but they are no 
longer as vital as they were for Germany's security concerns during the Cold War 
period. The university-educated young of the postwar generations even view the 
U.S. as an anti-model of both an unjust capitalism and as an aggressive world 
power.68 The critics of the U.S. pro-Israeli stance in the Middle East Peace 
Process are slowly becoming more vocal in German political elite. The former 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel argued that a mediator should be neutral, not 
biased and considering the legitimate interests of both conflicting parties.69 
However, the criticism remains kind; Berlin acts prudently, with the firmly 
established ties with Washington in mind. 
Values are changing in Germany society. The perception of the country's 
security environment, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union is that the 
Federal Republic is surrounded by friends and military security is no longer a 
primary concern. Environmental security, civil liberty and quality of life have a 
greater priority than materialistic values such as economic growth, law and order 
and country security. 
67 Ronald D. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall 1990-1993, (RAND Corporation 
1994), pp. 11-12 
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The new emerging leaders are more sensitive to these issues than 
previous ones. They have a specially aversion to the use of military force for 
conflict solution.70 
The perception of the State of Israel is also gradually changing; the 
images of the Holocaust are slowly fading away. Postwar generations do not like 
to be accused of or blamed for the atrocities as collective guilt occurring during 
the Third Reich. The well educated people, in addition, view Israel as an 
occupant of the West Bank and Gaza; they also consider Israel's settlements in 
the occupied territories and the treatment of the Palestinians as unjust and 
against international law. The political results of this aspects are a more 
indifferent picture of Israel and a change in political activities. The political 
implications on the Middle East could be Germany's future leadership 
generations being more focused on economic and other "real" interests rather 
than on an explicitly Israel-biased policy. How soon this will happen depends 
inter alias on Israel's politics. 
The latest visit by Chancellor Schroeder to the region is good evidence of 
how Berlin uses its economic power to exert political influence; "active economic 
presence" is the new foreign policy concept in the MENA region. 
70
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It distinguishes itself from Foreign Minister Genschers former "Scheckbuch 
Diplomatie" (checkbook diplomacy) in such a way that Germany offers economic 
support only for political service in return. Egypt's Prime Minister Mubarak , for 
example, has offered German companies to increasingly invest in Egypt. In turn, 
Schroeder expects Cairo to continue its support to the peace process.71 
Schroeder's visit is a clear sign of Berlin's new political stance in the 
region. Even when he continuously stated that Germany can only play a 
supportive role in a higher European concept, all political actors recognized quite 
well that neither the French Premier nor the British Prime Minister had visited the 
crisis region. His visit has given Germany great respect in both conflicting parties. 
C.       ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST 
The Federal Republic depends on foreign trade. On a per capita basis, the 
value of the country's exports is twice as much as Japan and more than three 
times higher than the United States.72 
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Germany's commitment to economic liberalism includes a distinction 
between political and economic affairs, which the business community especially 
supports because they try to remain "apolitical". This distinction becomes 
increasingly difficult as the state's international economic influence grows. 
Former President Richard von Weizäcker noted: "Free trade is not just the 
consequence of detente, it is a confidence-building measure in itself."73 In this 
sense cooperation and integration are regarded as effective means for 
influencing another country's actions. Economics is the vehicle to attain political 
objectives. 
German economic relations with the Middle East have largely been 
shaped by two factors: (1) the economic power of Germany as the biggest 
exporter of manufacturing goods, relying largely on imported energy (2) the 
abundance of low-cost oil in North Africa and the Gulf, which provides this 
energy.74 
In the aftermath of the 1973 war, the Arab states successfully used oil as a 
weapon, which caused the enormous rise in oil prices. From September 1973 to 
the end of that year, the price rose from $3.01 a barrel to $11.65 a barrel. The 
result was a tremendous boom in the Arab world: the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) rose from $41 billion in 1970 to $406 billion in 1980.75 
73
 Richard von Weizäcker, Eröffnung des Weltwirtschaftsforum in Berlin am 24.10.1986. Lothar 
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 Aziz Alkazaz, Die Oekonomie in Nahost in den 80 Jahren, in Aussenpolitik No. 3 / 1988, pp. 
256-269 
42 
The new wealth of the Middle East produced a sizeable increase in economic 
interaction and interdependency between Germany and the region. Economic 
relations intensified, based on the key assumption that interdependency would 
create domestic and regional stability and a regional order, which subsequently 
would provide the security required for mutual beneficial economic interaction. 
In the Iate1980s, in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War and the beginning of 
the Palestinian intifada, the economic importance of the Middle East declined 
dramatically.76 Other regions and sources fulfilled Germany's needs, especially 
oil, reducing Germany's vulnerability in supply disruptions and price 
manipulations. Trade and economic relations with the region were reduced, 
international trade with North America and East Asia intensified; moreover, the 
invention of new technologies decreased the dependence on energy for mostly 
all major industrial countries.77 
Foreign trade with the Middle East in 1999 was 1.7 percent, some DM33 
billion ($15.7 billion) of a total foreign trade of DM1.867 trillion ($889 billion). 
Germany exported mostly cars, electronics and steel products to the Middle East. 
The imports from the Arab countries were 1.4 percent of all imports; whereas, 
two-third of these imports were oil. The most important trading partners were 
Saudi Arabia and Libya.78 
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The case of Libya elucidates Germany's reluctance to impose economic 
sanctions against states. From the German perspective, sanctions are not 
considered as effective as cooperation in coping with another country. The 
economic and political costs associated with sanctions are considered too high, 
especially for a trading nation. 
Germany's unification, the transformation of Europe, and the 
metamorphosis of the world economy now give a momentum of new economic 
considerations. Germany, as a powerful Central European state, plays a crucial 
role in the transition of Eastern Europe. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
conjunction with Europe's integration has opened up markets in Eastern Europe, 
replacing trade with the Middle East in some areas. Germany directly benefits 
from this development, while already receiving considerable quantities of raw 
material, especially natural gas from Russia and the Ukraine. This relieves some 
political and economic pressure from Germany the becoming too dependent on 
insecure Middle Eastern oil and being forced on pursuing an active essentially 
pro-Arab policy, which could interfere with Germany's special relationship with 
Israel. 
Statistische    Bundesamt    Wiesbaden    (Federal    office    of    statistics);    available    online 
<http://www.statistik-bund.de/download/aussh/aussh_d/gesamt.pdf> (April 9 2001) 
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1.     Technology Transfer and German Arms Sales 
The historical legacy of the Third Reich has limited the German role of 
arms export and military intervention. The Federal Republic Constitution contains 
a number of provisions, forced by the former allied powers prohibiting or limiting 
actions that threaten international peace and stability. In addition to these 
limitations, the West German government constantly argued that the German 
Basic Law prohibits the use of West German forces outside of the NATO area. 
Germany's role in the military sector is somewhat paradox. Revelations in 
the years 1988 - 1990 made it clear that several German companies had been 
very active in oil-rich Arab countries, building weapon factories and / or delivering 
components to produce chemical weapons. The most famous case is the Libyan 
chemical plant at Rabta, built with secret support by one German company. The 
German press claimed that other companies were also involved in similar 
projects. This clear violation of German export laws was possible due to less 
stringent controls of sensitive exports. It was a substantial contribution to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. In conjunction with the 
pressure generated in Washington, the German Parliament was forced to pass a 
law (1 July 1990) tightening the export of sensitive export items.79 
79
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Decisions in Germany on the export of war weapons and other military 
equipment are mainly based on the Political Principles Governing the Export of 
War Weapons and Other Military Equipment (Political Principles) of 1982 
(amended May 21, 1999) and on the relevant European and international 
commitments entered into by the German government. The principles of 
Germany's export policy are reflected in military equipment accounting for only a 
small proportion of total German exports. Exports of war weapons traditionally 
account for less than 0.5 percent of all exports, and mainly go to countries which 
are members of NATO or the OECD.80 
Arms transfer to Israel can be traced back to the late 1950s when the 
Federal Republic supplied the Jewish state with patrol boats, motor vehicles and 
training aircraft and helicopters. Israel, in turn, offered the 'Bundeswehr' the 'Uzi' 
machine pistol, which proved its usefulness during the Suez Campaign. Through 
the years, Israel received significant quantities of, mainly U.S.-made, German 
weapons, including combat tanks, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guided 
missilies.81 
The 'Leopard-2 tank", requested by Saudi Arabia in 1980, became the 
synonym for Germany's export policy dilemma in the Middle East. Riyadh asked 
for 300 "Leopard-2 tanks", 1,000 "Marder" (armored personnel carriers) and 
"Gepard" (self-propelled anti-aircraft gun). 
80
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Chancellor Schmidt viewed this arms deal as a golden opportunity directly 
promoting German economic interests, serving wider NATO objectives as well as 
satisfying the U.S. demand for a greater German contribution to the Gulf security. 
The Saudi Arabia's hostility toward the Jewish state and the heavy burden 
of the Nazi past, however, reduced the political debate to a question of whether a 
lucrative deal should supersede the moral obligation toward the Jews. The 
debate continued until November 1987 when the issue was quietly dropped in the 
'Bundestag'. The uncompromising nature of the Arab - Israeli conflict prevented 
a lucrative deal.82 The Federal Republic was (is) not really independent in its 
foreign policy decisions; giving military support to one side without automatically 
alienating the other is a price it can not afford. 
2.     Trade Relations with Israel 
Today, the German - Israeli economic relationship operates intensively 
and successfully with The Federal Republic being Israel's second-largest trading 
partner. Trade increased by 15 percent to $3.3 billion in the first three quarters of 
the year 2000. The EU - Israel Association Agreement is, in this sense, the 
vehicle for a very flourishing bilateral trade, which started in 1989 with duty free 
trade in both directions. In recent years, cooperation between German and Israeli 
companies in high tech sectors such as information technology, communication 
and biotechnology has dramatically increased. 
82
 According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, pressure by pro-Zionists in the Federal 
Republic led to the final denial. Karsh, pp. 141-144; see also Lavy, p. 202 
47 
Companies, such as VOLKSWAGEN, DAIMLERCHRYSLER, SIEMENS and 
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, are strongly present in Israel, smartly investing in the 
fast growing 'high-tech market'. 83 SIEMENS, for example, began its activities 
before the formation of the State of Israel. Since the early 1960s, SIEMENS has 
expanded its activities through its local agents. The Declaration of Principles 
(DoP or Oslo Accords) in 1993 gave new momentum to business contacts in 
Israel. At the end of 1998, announced the launching of one of the first 
cooperative ventures between Israeli- and Palestinian-based companies in the 
high-tech industry.84 
VOLKSWAGEN made the largest investment in the Jewish state; it have 
invested $250 million in joint ventures. Together with the 'Dead Sea Woks' 
company, they produce magnesium parts for the car industry. Israel's 
government supports this joint venture with $133 million. The knowledge flow 
between the German and the Israeli markets and politics has increased in recent 
years, thus promoting an intense relationship in a variety of fields. 
83
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German financial institutions are looking for collaboration with Israel. The 
DEUTSCHE BANK recently opened a representative office in Tel-Aviv and the 
COMMERZBANK joined a cooperation with DISCOUNT BANK, the third largest 
bank in Israel.85 However, important to note is that the business-flow in both 
directions. Most of the large Israeli banks have representative offices in 
Germany. These economic and financial activities assist the Israeli business 
community in a thorough understanding of the German social market economy. 
3.       Bilateral Economic Relations and Development Cooperation 
with the Palestinian Authority 
The trade relation between Germany and the Palestinian Authority (PA) is, 
from the German perspective and in comparison with Israel, insignificant.86 It is, 
however, essential for the Palestinian economy and it gives Berlin a leverage for 
political activities. 
In addition to the donations given by the Federal Republic through the 
European network, Germany financially assists the PA on a bilateral basis; loans 
and credits are recurrently given to the Palestinians.87 
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The German business community started a Palestinian-German Business Start- 
up Program in 1997 to encourage new and growing businesses in all sectors of 
the Palestinian economy. As a second project, the Business Idea Forum was 
launched as an additional initiative to the program exploring specific areas of 
growth and joining the cooperation of competent partners in the given sectors. 
The political situation and the administrative problems of a country in the 
process of 'official creation' offers very limited incentives for investment by 
German companies. However, the opening of the office of German industry in 
1995 in Ramallah attests the interest of the German business sector. In July 
2000, an investment promotion and protection agreement between the PA and 
the German industry was signed. Trilateral economic projects in the steel industry 
and the telecommunication sector between Germany, the Palestinian territories 
and Israel have been created and may serve as a paradigm for future 
cooperation in other areas.88 
The Palestinian economy does not have an independent outlet for its 
exports. All its products must transit through Israel or through Israeli-controlled 
borders. Palestinian trade is heavily concentrated on Israel: 90 percent of the 
imports are coming from Israel, 80 of the percent exports are going to Israel.89 
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In times when Israel partially or totally closes the borders to the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank, it prevents the PA from freely trading with world markets. The "Al- 
Aqsa-lntifada", which started in fall 2000, caused the Palestinian economy a 
greatly decline by 50 percent in its productivity; the results are a loss of $630 
million for the PA budget and a clear deterioration of living conditions for all 
people living in the Palestinian territories. 
Political goals supersede economic interests; however, a positive 
Palestinian economic development is considered Israel's best long-term security 
guarantee. In this context the German - Palestinian economic relation is still in its 
infancy, but will increase, for mutual benefit, when the Palestinian state is 
officially declared. 
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IV.  GERMANY AND ISRAEL: A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP!? 
In 1949, one year after the declaration of independence, the state of Israel 
began to distribute passports, which looked very similar to those of other 
countries. Only one black postmark that briefly limited the area of validity was 
conspicuous : "valid for all countries, with the exception of Germany."90 Not one 
of Israel's direct hostile neighbors were excluded, which would have been 
reasonable; the prohibition applied only to the new German state(s). In response, 
no Israeli was allowed to travel to Germany. For most Israelis this restriction was 
not only acceptable, but taken for granted since no Israeli really thought about 
traveling to Germany. Today the shadows of Hitler's Third Reich atrocities are 
still hanging over the states and the societies of Israel and Germany. 
Sovereign states, in their behavior towards each other, are normally 
motivated by self-interest. The policies of states can also differ with respect to the 
past. States can ignore history and, instead, orient policy toward present day or 
future interests, which in German is called Tagespolitik, i.e. day-to-day policy. 
States can, alternatively, base their actions on historical experience, which is 
called Geschichtspolitik, i.e. politics of history. In this context political decision- 
making deals with the continuing presence of the past. This historical framework 
applies to domestic as well as foreign policy and can be a significant factor in the 
representation and identity of the state as well as of its citizens.91 
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The relationship between, the State of Israel, which emerged in 1948, and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, established by the victorious allies in the 
summer of 1949, was strictly determined by Geschichtspolitik. The relationship 
began in 1950 against the background of the Hitler's extermination of millions of 
Jews. This act of genocide has had a profound impact on the Jewish and the 
German peoples as well as on both states. At first Israel's leadership neglected 
the existence of a new German state, until they were forced to negotiate directly 
on compensation and reparation matters. Israel started the relationship with a 
claim against the Germans for reparations and material compensation for the 
horrors committed during the National Socialist regime. 
A very sensitive and difficult relationship very slowly developed between 
both states. On one hand, deals and arrangements for mutual benefit were 
unofficially and secretly made against public opinion in both states. However, the 
behavior of West Germany's leadership toward a more rational and pragmatic 
orientated action changed shortly prior to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations in 1965..Israel's leadership, on the other hand, had to act upon national 
interests. From its day of independence, Israel had to fight for survival against 
bad odds. Surrounded by hostile neighbors, Israel had to search for any possible 
military, economical or diplomatic support. Therefore, Israel's government 
arranged, despite opposite public opinion, secret agreements with West 
Germany, which at first were designed as material compensation but 
subsequently changed into diplomatic, military and economical aid. 
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A.       FIRST    CONTACTS    AND    THE    QUESTION    OF    DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS 
The question of a present-day or future relationship between Israel and 
Germany began to arise only when the government of Israel drafted claims 
against Germany. Konrad Adenauer accepted, in principle, that such claims were 
justified and negotiable. In the end the governments of both countries saw the 
need to bring about rapprochement. 
The international political changes were very important in the development 
of the relations between both countries. The international political system, which 
became known in the early 1950s, affected virtually all countries of the world. The 
developing power struggle between the two superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, forced nearly every nation to take a side in this East - West 
conflict. Thus, both the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel were drawn into 
the conflict. It was this conflict that indirectly helped the two governments to move 
toward each other, because both countries were closely linked to the United 
States. 
1.   The Restitution Agreement and 'Wiedergutmachung' 
Even if the West German Government proclaimed its constitution on May 
23 1949, Israel's society and government negated the recognition of this new 
German state, because of deeply antagonistic feelings. 
55 
On 16 January 1951 Israel sent correspondence to the four allies' powers, in 
which it complained about the meager and unsatisfactory restitution and 
indemnifying legislation that had existed in West Germany. On March 12, Israel 
added a very specific demand for compensation and reparations of $1.5 billion 
(two-thirds of this was to be paid by the Federal Republic, one-third by the 
German Democratic Republic) to Israel as a payment for the resettling of 500,000 
Jews.92 
The Soviet Union never replied to this notes. The Western powers 
recognized the moral justification for the demand, however, they did not know on 
what legal grounds to base it. The request had nothing to do with individual 
compensation; it was a request of the State of Israel. Nonetheless, during the 
Third Reich era no State of Israel had existed, which meant that Israel and 
Germany had not been at war with each other and the term 'reparations' was, 
therefore, not applicable. 
The reply of the Western allies to Israel was very cautious. On July 5, 1951 
the United States expressed regret that it could not impose on the government of 
West Germany to pay reparations to Israel. This meant in other words, Israel 
could no longer ignore the German state if it wanted to get reparations paid. Only 
direct negotiations would be the right approach to this problem.93 
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Israel's economic situation at that time was very desperate. Due to the influx of 
the thousand of survivors, now immigrating into Israel's society, and also 
because of the Arab - Israeli war(s), Israel had to make use of every source of 
income it could. Based on the very poor economical situation in Israel and 
despite opposed public opinion, the government decided to except the existence 
of a German state and to negotiate directly with Germany. As a precondition to 
direct contacts with the Germans, the Ben-Gurion Government insisted on a 
public acknowledgment of guilt on the part of West Germany. Chancellor 
Adenauer was expected to acknowledge the collective guilt of all Germans for the 
Holocaust. On September 27 1951, he addressed the German parliament 
concerning responsibility for the Holocaust and called for "moral and material 
restitution"; he did not mention collective guilt. 
The Israeli government reacted to the statement with caution and 
skepticism. Yet, it admitted that the statement appeared to be, at least, an 
attempt of the German government to initiate some measure of moral and 
material compensation. Additionally it seemed that the German people felt the 
obligation to compensate the Jewish people, morally and materially, both on an 
individual and on a collective basis.94 
There was considerable disagreement within West Germany's society about 
the need to offer compensation, as requested in Israel's note of March 1951. A 
few supporters of the former Hitler regime said that no German owed anything to 
the Jews. 
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However, the majority accepted the obligation to compensate those individual 
Jewish victims who had suffered persecution, survived and immigrated to Israel 
or to other countries. Compensation to the State of Israel, however, was a 
different matter. Many West Germans used the legal argument of the non- 
existence of Israel at the time of the Third Reich crimes in order to oppose the 
Israeli claim.95 Besides the Israeli claim, the Conference of Jewish Material 
Claims against Germany (known as the Claim Conference) requested 
compensation for Jews who lived in countries other than Israel. Finally, the 
London Debt Conference negotiated the amount of the pre-war and war debt 
Germany, as the successor of the German Reich, had to pay. 
Although by 1951 economic recovery in West Germany was preceding well, 
the complete financial burdens were expected to be around some DM11.5 billion 
(some $5.5 billion).96 Despite theses heavy commitments, the German 
government under Chancellor Adenauer declared in the 'Bundestag' that it was 
willing and ready to join the representatives of Jewry and of the State of Israel to 
bring about a solution of the problem of material restitution. 
The negotiations began on 21 March 1952 at Wassenaar, in the 
Netherlands, and ended at the signing of the 'Restitution Agreement' at 
Luxembourg on 10 September. 
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Germany finally agreed to pay DM3.45 billion (some $1.6 billion) to the State of 
Israel and DM450 million (some $214 million) to the Claim Conference. This 
payment would be mainly goods and would last over a period of 14 years.97 Why 
did West Germany impose such a heavy burden on the country by making this 
large compensation payment to Israel? Even if the Germans were under close 
scrutiny by governments and peoples of their former enemies, by the early 1950s 
they proved themselves as reliable allies. West Germany had established a firm 
and stable democracy, which cooperated with the West. The answer to the 
question can only be that West Germany had accepted a moral responsibility 
toward the state of Israel and Israel's society and acted out of moral debt. 
2.     The Question of Diplomatic Relations 
The armistice agreements with its Arab neighbors, after the War of 
Independence, "drove" Israel with relatively stable politics through the 1950s. 
However, the general Arab attitude has been that the Israelis are foreign 
intruders, who have taken away land belonging to the Arabs and driven many of 
its inhabitants into exile. Thus, the Jewish refugees, who were settled in 
Palestine, created a "new" problem - the Arab refugee. Because of the British 
'Balfour Declaration' and the United States' support to Israel, the Arab struggle 
against Israel was, in the mind of the Arabs a sense, a fight for freedom from 
western domination. 
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Israel continued to be heavily dependent on armament delivery. However, 
both the U.S. and West Germany were reluctant to supply arms to Israel for fear 
of offending the Arabs. The United States leadership was unsuccessful in 
bringing the Arabs states into their alliance system. Although successive 
administrations have declared that Israel's survival was a primary American 
interest, they have to take into account the Middle Eastern situation as a whole.98 
This mainly means to deny the Soviet Union access to the Middle East. 
Israel' s government and society believed the Germans must take 
responsibility for the Holocaust. This belief supports the claim that the Germans 
owe the Israelis a moral debt and Jews are entitled to special consideration. The 
Adenauer regime recognized this and made a large restitution payment to Israel. 
Credit for the successful outcome of the negotiations with Israel must, therefore, 
be given to Adenauer and his office. His politics and policy with respect to Israel 
alienated the Arab states, which were bound in bitter conflict with Israel. 
However, the extension of diplomatic relations between West Germany and 
Israel was an important step for the integration of West Germany into the 
Western community while also serving as a trend toward pragmatic, rational 
politics in the relationship between West Germany and Israel. 
But even after the "restitution declaration" of the German parliament in 
1951, it was clear for both sides, Bonn and Jerusalem, that diplomatic relations 
were, as yet, out of the question. 
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In fact, the mere existence of minimal contacts with West Germany and the 
debate in the Knesset (Israel's Parliament) on the reparations agreement 
initiated one of the gravest political crises Israel ever had. 
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's decision stressed Israel's economic need to 
provide for the resettlement and rehabilitation of the immigrants. A highly 
controversial debate erupted on this issue and intensified the discord between 
David Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin, the opposition leader in the Knesset. 
Ben-Gurion refused to consider a government coalition with Begin and his 
Herut party and even refused to call Begin by name in Knesset debates." 
In January 1952, Begin came close to proclaiming a rebellion. Israel's 
citizens demonstrated heavily against contacts with the most menacing country 
- West Germany. The demonstrators laid siege to the Knesset and threw 
stones on parliament members.100 It was Ben-Gurion, as the "Father-figure", as 
well as the fulfilling of the West German government's program of reparations 
to Israel that dispersed this crisis. In September 1953, the Israeli government 
publicly credited the Adenauer regime with having faithfully carried out its 
bargaining. 
In 1963 it was clear that the fulfillment of the agreement would be 
completed approximately four years ahead of schedule. 
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This was possible because of the earnest desire of the Adenauer government 
to speedily meet this obligation and because of the enormous expansion of the 
German economy in the past decade, making it feasible for West Germany to 
increasingly divert greater annual amounts of its production to Israeli 
reparations. The impact on the Israeli economy has been immense. By 1961 
West Germany was the second biggest trade partner (behind Great Britain) to 
Israel.101 
The opinion of Israel's society and government toward the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with West Germany slowly changed. Prime Minister Ben- 
Gurion made a speech to the Knesset, containing three main points: Israel was 
interested in maintaining the status quo (the aftermath of the Suez Campaign) 
in the Middle East as long as possible; Israel would strengthen its defense as 
much as possible; and Israel was interested in acquiring as many friends as 
possible in the world, including West Germany.102 
The West German government responded very cautiously. West German 
leadership feared the official recognition of the German Democratic Republic by 
the Arab states as well as the threat of German economy losing some of its 
good contracts with the Arabs. There was therefore no urgent need to officially 
establish diplomatic relations. 
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Israel had built a mission in Cologne with the main purpose of purchasing 
goods under the Restitution Agreement and supervising the agreement so it 
worked smoothly. The mission was led by an "ambassador" without diplomatic 
status. Since the West German Government had no equivalent to the "Cologne 
Mission" it had to rely on a major West German news agency and its 
representatives in Tel Aviv to obtain information and the political trends on the 
situation in Israel.103 
The West German public (mostly students), opposing its own government, 
urged its leadership to establish diplomatic a relation with Israel. There was an 
ambassador in Cairo and Damascus but why not in Jerusalem (Tel Aviv)? 
Interrelations between Israel's and West Germany's citizens had intensified over 
this last ten years. More and more Germans were traveling to Israel: the number 
rose from 497 visitors in 1955 to 12,921 in 1965.104 Most of the travelers were 
students of political education in Israel on a "semi-official" basis. They in turn 
invited Israel's students to visit West Germany. 
An opinion poll among Israeli students of Haifa Technical College in 1963, 
however, concluded that the majority rejected communicating with German 
students.105 One explanation for this refusal of the Israeli students was due to a 
great extent to the unsatisfactory development of West German - Israeli 
relations. 
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The media, in the late 1962, additionally brought news about German scientists, 
who assisted Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in building a new missile 
program, primarily targeted against Israel.106 This also influenced the opinion poll. 
In October 1963, Professor Erhard, the successor to Adenauer as 
chancellor, stated that the question was not whether to engage in diplomatic 
relations but when. However, he also stated that diplomatic relations with Israel 
would mean a change of balance in the Near East, as the Arabs would then 
engage in diplomatic relations with East Germany and, subsequently, with the 
Soviet Union.107 
Early in 1965 the Hallstein Doctrine proved to be an obstacle rather than a 
helpful instrument of diplomacy when the United Arab Republic (UAR) 
"blackmailed" West Germany in order to stop armament shipments to Israel. 
Egyptian President Nasser's invitation to East German leader Walter Ulbricht 
alarmed the Bonn government and drove it into a crisis. Nasser's behavior was a 
threat to Adenauer's aim to unify both German states. Nonetheless, Egypt, as the 
first state outside the Warsaw Pact, was able to establish diplomatic relations 
with East Germany.108 The West Germans fell into the trap and broke their 
"secret arms agreement" with Israel, thereby instigating a lot of criticism and 
charges of anti-Semitism. 
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Bonn immediately replied and began negotiations for an exchange of 
ambassadors with Israel. This, in turn, caused the Arab countries, with the 
exception of Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, to break off diplomatic relations with 
West Germany. 
The official date for establishment of diplomatic relations was May 12 1965. 
The first ambassadors were chosen very carefully, however, there was some 
initial disagreement in both countries. The man chosen by the West German 
government was Dr. Rolf Pauls, who served as an officer of the "Wehrmacht"; 
This fact made him unpopular with the Israeli public. On his arrival in Jerusalem, 
he faced demonstrations as he handed his accreditation papers to Israel's 
President Shazar. However, the Israeli government accepted him, because he 
was well-known as a sincere man, who had been an official at the West German 
Foreign Office dealing with questions of development aid and issues of future 
economic aid to Israel.109 
Israel appointed Asher Ben-Natan as ambassador. He had been a high 
official in the Israeli Ministry of Defense who was concerned with the arms 
delivery by West Germany to Israel under the secret arms agreement. His 
appointment was, therefore, regarded in Bonn as an "error of judgment" by the 
Israeli government. A man who was so deeply involved in former arms delivery 
could further increase Arab suspicions against intensified West German - Israeli 
relations. 
109Lavy, pp. 130-133 
65 
Nonetheless, because the Israeli government accepted Pauls appointment, Bonn 
overcame it concerns and accepted Ben-Natan as Israel's first ambassador.110 
B.       THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND GERMAN UNIFICATION 
After many years of improving relations in many fields, Germany is now 
the second most important partner to Israel behind the United States.111 Five 
dynamic interrelated factors dominate the German - Israel relationship today: 
• The Holocaust, a unique responsibility for Germany, with stability and 
security for the State of Israel 
• Both countries, who have common liberal democratic values, wish to 
continue good relations for mutual benefit 
• The peace process in the Middle East, combined with the hope for a long 
and lasting peace for the people in the region 
• The  significant  part Germany  plays  in the  political  and  economical 
relations between Israel and the European Union 
• A very intense personal relationship between important actors in both 
countries, which even resists negative trends and retrogrades112 
In 1990, Israel, confronted with Germany's re-unification, had to redefine 
its attitude toward the Federal Republic. After a brief reflection in the Knesset, 
Israel elected, in total consensus between the governing Likud Party and the 
opposing Labor Party, to pursue the policy of Ben-Gurion. 
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l nd - Israel in Moderner Zeit, available online <www.auswaertiges- 
Former President of the State of Israel, Chaim Herzog, gave the following 
statement in an Israeli television program on 6 October 1990: 
...Ben Gurion laid down Israel's policy towards Germany, and that is 
the applicable policy to this very day, even with Germany reunited. In 
other words, the most precious asset the Jewish people have is the 
state of Israel, its future and its security. That was the basis of his 
policy with regard to Germany in the past, and it ought to continue 
with regard to the future.113 
In Israel's society, Germany's unification was viewed very differently. 
Sixty-five % of the population was positive toward unification, while 35 % were 
anxious. 'Maariv', the second largest newspaper in Israel, wrote, "Germany's 
reunification can not be prevented, however, everyone who loves his life should 
be on one's guard, because of Germany's reunification, now the "Fourth Reich" 
evolves in the Heart of Europe"114 
Many Israelis have an indifferent portrayal on Germany, strengthened by 
the media, particularly television. On the one hand, there is a kind of admiration 
for the German traits of efficiency, courtesy and technical and cultural attainment. 
On the other hand, there is a feeling of fear, in manifestation of neo-Nazism, 
isolationism and hostilities against foreigners in Germany. Germany is invariably 
seen as far stronger and more menacing than other countries, even if, over the 
years, diplomatic relations have expanded beyond into the culture and other 
links.115 
113Witzthum, p. 72 
114
 Die Beziehung Deutschland - Israel in Moderner Zeit, available online <www.auswaertiges- 
amt.org> (February 15 2001) 
115Witzhum, p. 78 
67 
In terms of political practice, both countries view each other as a 'special 
case'. Israel received more German aid, more frequently, than any other country. 
This favored, in some sense, Germany's economy. The interests of its own 
economic policies or industry dictated Bonn's political aspirations toward Israel. 
Israel's leadership also treated Germany in accordance with its own needs and 
interests, frequently diverging from the line of public opinion and that of Jewish 
organizations. 
Two months before the formal reunification of Germany, the Gulf crisis 
emerged and with it a big burden on German - Israel relations. Iraq's President 
Saddam Hussein fired 'Scud' missiles (surface-to-surface) against Israel; 
German know-how brought Israel within the range of the Scud's. A gigantic anti- 
German demonstration erupted as reports by Israel's media were published 
stating Germany also helped Iraq to develop gas weapons for mass construction. 
Many Israelis came to associate the missile attacks, possibly equipped with 
chemical warheads, with the Holocaust, and the annihilation of millions of Jews in 
gas chambers. Germany's government frantically reacted trying to appease 
Israel's society. Chancellor Kohl proclaimed: 
Israel should know that it can count on our solidarity in these dark 
days. [By delivering defense material], we act according to the 
special responsibility [the Federal Republic] has always 
demonstrated toward Israel.116 
Besides many high-ranking delegations from all political parties, Foreign Minister 
Genscher was sent to Israel, with a DM250 million check in hand, to deal with 
this unpleasant business. 
116
 A declaration before the 'Bundestag' on January 30 1991. Cited in Joffe, p. 205 
68 
He pledged monetary and military assistance. "Hawk" anti-aircraft missiles and 
"Patriot" anti-missile missiles were delivered to Israel in order to defend Israel soil 
against further attacks. Additionally, only after a few days, a "shopping list" was 
drawn up by Israeli leadership, including two new submarines, build by German 
shipyards for Israel's navy.117 
C.   NORMALCY AND THE END OF THE PAST 
The new multi-polar world order in the post-Gulf War era influences both 
countries and their behavior toward each other. The dramatic changes in the 
early 1990s changed the roles of both countries as actors in the international 
system. Israel continued to realize that Germany, despite initial uncertainties 
eventually made tremendous efforts for Israel's strategic and economic survival. 
The existence of Israel confronted the Germans with their national history, 
especially with their National-Socialist history. The conduct of normal pragmatic 
policy, based on present-day and future interests, appears nearly impossible with 
the continuing presence of the past. Germany's first state actions toward Israel 
were, therefore, more determined by a 'moral debt' caused by the legacy of the 
Hitler regime than by national interest. Over half a century after the holocaust, 
German diplomacy still pays tribute to a special obligation to Israel. 
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The holocaust, as President Richard von Weizsaecker put it on 3 October 1990, 
the official day of reunification, was the most horrible of crimes, and shall forever 
remember the victims.118 
Today, 36 years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, both 
countries have established a viable, interactive network of political, economic, 
social and cultural ties. These close ties are still viewed against the background 
of the Holocaust. The present German ambassador to Israel, Rudolf Dressier 
notes: 
Relations between German and Israel are special and must never 
normalize themselves in the sense that we [the Germans] have 
normal relations with Holland or the United States. We [the 
Germans], feel co-responsible that the existence of Israel be 
guaranteed, and the political consequence is that, when in doubt, 
we [the Germans] side with Israel, because that is our unique 
duty.119 
The acting president of the Federal Republic, Johannes Rau, argues, "the 
question is often asked whether, given the past, there can be such a thing as 
normality between Germans and Israelis... the only answer I can give is "No". 
The relationship between our countries will always be a special one... By 
learning the lessons of the past we build our common future."120 
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Israeli leadership acknowledged this view. The then Prime Minister Ehud 
Barak replied to the German President's speech that Germany today is one of 
Israel's most important friends in Europe and that both countries have a special 
relationship. This can be used as an example for overcoming the past while not 
forgetting, for a moment, what can never be forgotten.121 
The past is not forgotten; Israeli politicians continue to remind the 
Germans of this fact. In dealing with the legacy of the Hitler regime, the Federal 
Republic has legislated and implemented a comprehensive system of restitution. 
German compensation and restitution for individual suffering, loss of life, health 
and liberty are to date a total of over DM100 billion (some DM200 billion in 
today's value, $104 billion) plus DM1.2 billion ($624 million) annually for about 
100.000 pensioners.122 
On the other hand there are signs that both states are in the process of 
adjusting their foreign policies to the realities of the new international system and 
normalizing their relations. The younger generation of politicians in both states 
are able to differentiate between the Holocaust and "businesslike Realpolitik". 
Critics on Israel's policy toward the Palestinians has nothing to do with anti- 
Semitism. German general policy is to fight violations of human rights and 
international law, this includes Israeli actions against the people in the West Bank 
and Gaza. 
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In this context State Minister Volmer called for a stop of Israel's settlements in 
Palestinian territories during his speech about the situation in the Middle East in 
the German Parliament in December 2000. However, to balance his call he also 
asked the PA to cease violence against Israeli citizens.123 
The perception that the relationship has reached a new stage also exists 
in the societies of both states. Public opinion polls reflect these perceptions: 76 
percent of all German respondents are (again) sympathetic with the State of 
Israel but view it as "a state like any other" while 64 percent of all Israelis agree 
that a "new Germany" exists.124 The moral obligation to the Jewish state changed 
in quality over time but it is still a very sensitive issue in Germany's society. "Anti- 
Semitism" and "neo-Nazis" are highly emotional expressions in the German mind. 
Although very good interrelations have been established between both states, 
normalcy in Jewish - German relations is not yet possible. Jewish institutions and 
public figures need police protection and associations with "Jews" are still like 
"Auschwitz" and "Endloesung" (final solution). 
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Regardless that some right-wing parties have recently entered 'Laender 
parliaments',125 it is out of the question that Germany's successful and prospering 
democracy will return to a dictatorship regime. The changes in attitude toward 
Israel are predicated on the Germans not forgetting the past nor allowing the 
moral debt to supersede national interests. 
D.       GERMANY'S POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE PALESTINIANS 
Following the Six Day War of June 1967, for over 20 years Germany saw 
only a refugee problem in the Palestinians. The "Palestinian Question" was first 
treated in conjunction with Chancellor Brandt's politics of detente and his goal to 
achieve a larger political and economic stance in the Middle East. West Germany 
was the first EC member to stress the Palestinian rights of self-determination in 
1974. Since German leadership claimed self-determination for all Germans, it 
could not really refuse this right to the Palestinians. To counterbalance this 
declaration toward Israel, Bonn made Palestinian self-determination dependent 
on Israel's existence in "secure borders". 
During the 1970s and 1980s, relations with the PLO were on a low level; 
no West German politician had ever met with Yassir Arafat. However, Chancellor 
Schmidt's "politics of new assertiveness" led to a less "Israeli-biased", more 
objective policy on the "Palestinian Question". 
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He took the offensive and argued against an Israeli expansionist settlement 
policy, for the Palestinian right of self-determination and for a Palestinian state. 
The then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin reacted very undiplomatically 
saying that a country that had killed six million Jews should not make 
recommendations to Israel.126 
An example of Bonn's diverging responsibilities and interests in the Israeli 
- Palestinian conflict was the Venice declaration of the European Council on 
June 13,1980, in this German leadership again stressed the Palestinians right of 
self-determination and the necessity to include the PLO in the negotiations on a 
peaceful termination of the conflict.12T However, Bonn was acting cautiously on 
this issue by not contradicting the United States or criticizing Israel. 
Since reunification and the signing of the "Oslo Accords" between Israel 
and the PA, Germany has been successfully pursuing a "quiet and calm 
diplomacy" ("stille Diplomatie") in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict, either as a 
single national approach or through a multinational network. Evidence of this is 
Germany's absence in casting its vote regarding the condemnation of the Israeli 
settlement policy in East Jerusalem (Har Homa) in the UN General Assembly in 
March 1997 and Chancellor Schroeder's trip to the region in the aftermath of Ariel 
Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in late September 2000.128 
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Within German politics and society there is a sympathetic trend in terms of 
the "Palestinian question". Some politicians and intellectuals view Israel as the 
"regional hegemon", which had occupied the territories in the 1967 War. In their 
opinion Israel should back away from its "hardliner position", open the Palestinian 
political economy and earnestly support the creation of a Palestinian state. 
Germany's policy toward the Palestinians cannot be considered regardless of the 
Arab. The Arab states view the Federal Republic as more of an honest mediator 
than the United States, this means that a German engagement in a mediating 
role could be beneficial for both sides. Israel could also benefits from such an 
engagement because of the "moral debt" as leverage and its intense bilateral 
relations with Germany. 
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V.      GERMANY, THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
The role Germany is playing in Europe has changed. The unified state is a 
highly influential civilian power in the heart of Europe. Surrounded by friendly, 
democratic and cooperative states, the Federal Republic is the advocate for a 
deeply and widely integrated Europe. In conjunction with its neighbors and its 
senior partner, the United States, Berlin struggles for democratization, security 
and economic prosperity for the whole of Europe and beyond its borders. 
Germany with its integrated multilateral approach to foreign policy is the 
propeller for a united Europe. It has been the driving force behind the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty on European integration, which was the 
foundation for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).129 Pursuing its 
national interests through European supranational institutions is politically much 
more promising than following a unilateral national path. With its integrated 
European policy, however, Berlin faces a dilemma. A strongly united Europe with 
a clear dedication to its own security policy could undermine the Atlantic Alliance 
and lead to a lessening of Germany's "senior partner" commitment to Europe. 
However, Germany and Europe need the U.S. for the foreseeable future, as a 
"partner in leadership" possessing strategic capabilities that the Europeans do 
not have and as an ally struggling for the same values in the international 
environment. A self-confident Europe, on the other hand, competes with the U.S. 
and Japan for access to lucrative markets in the global economy. 
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During Germany's second presidency of the EU (1999) a constant backing 
of the Middle East Peace Process was one of its top priorities. The Federal 
Republic has sought to consolidate the European role in the peace process and 
to further coordinate effective efforts with the US to bolster the role of the EU in 
the peace process. 
Europe is changing also. It is in the process of becoming a political player 
with a single voice in the international system, which is not as militarily powerful 
as the United States, but it is, nevertheless, of equal value in economic and 
monetary terms.130 Europe's old political and strategic order is no longer in force. 
The break-up of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact 
resulted in a radical transformation of the political structure. The European 
strategic geography, however, presents an inconsistent picture, in the West the 
complex system of interrelationships has gradually deepened and the process of 
integration continues, while the political economies in the East and the Southeast 
of Europe are fragmented and mostly characterized by centrifugal tendencies. 
The risk of a major war in Central Europe has been replaced by a 
multitude of risk factors of a different nature in a broad spectrum, which mostly 
happens on Europe's periphery.131 
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These challenges and risk factors might comprise far reaching consequences 
that hamper Central Europe's political and economic abilities, including of 
Germany's. 
The world economy deepens and continues to expand, moreover, Asian 
countries' participation in the economic system increases. This means that the 
Mediterranean will become even more important as a major route for the 
movement of vital resources. The international interdependent system cannot 
tolerate interruption and risk, and thus the region requires stability. The European 
Union's relations with the countries to the South and to the Southeast of the 
Mediterranean are based on a policy, which reflects the economic, political and 
strategic importance of the region to the EU. The Middle East region, with the 
Mediterranean as a 'bridge', is an area of increased political and security interest 
to Europe. 
The demographic factor combined with political instability and a growing 
gap in living standards promotes growing tension between Christian Europe and 
the Muslim countries of the Middle East.132 Many Western analysts view the 
security concern of the Middle East in the context of a broad Mediterranean 
security issue. 
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Stephen J. Blank (Research Professor at the Strategie Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College) argues that 
... the [Mediterranean] regional agenda goes from Algeria's civil 
strife or Turkey's Kurdish insurgency to include Lebanon, the peace 
process, Israel's overall relations with its Arab neighbors, the whole 
Balkan cauldron, pervasive economic backwardness throughout 
most of the former Ottoman empire, the use of transnational crime 
including narcotics trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and, of course, the activities of the great powers in 
areas of long-standing rivalry and intervention. 
Among European countries national positions still prevail, however, the European 
Union134 is developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which puts 
emphasis on Europe's "Southern flank". Europe's interest in the Middle East lies 
mainly in access to the energy resources in the region, but in an increasingly 
interdependent world, Europe's objectives are not solely energy related. The 
states of Europe need political, economic and social stability in the Middle East, 
(1) for their own prosperity, in terms of economic growth and free movement of 
goods (2) for the well-being of the countries in the region; without this Europe 
would be confronted with mass influx of immigrants coming across the 
Mediterranean that would shake its political, economic and social order. 
133
 Stephen J. Blank (ed.), Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millennium, (Strategic Studies 
Institute 1999), p. 2 
134
 Today, 15 European countries are members of the EU. The enlargement includes Sweden, 
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can be said that the EU represents Europe, with the exception of Russia and the Ukraine, as a 
whole. 
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The aims and goals of the Euro - Mediterranean Partnership, like political 
and economical cooperation with the nations of the Middle East, are laid down in 
the "Barcelona Declaration". Both the EU Council and the European Commission 
have identified this region as special priority for the EU. However, while the EU 
has a "high level" of influence in terms of economic relations and financial aid in 
the Middle East, it still has a "less intensive" importance in pure political aspects 
because of the (still) hegemonic stand of the United States in the region. 
Two important factors shaping Europe's policy toward the region (1) the 
demographics of the area; for a generation Europeans have suspiciously 
watched the "population bomb" on the southern and eastern borders of the 
Mediterranean, (2) Europe's economic interdependence with the Middle East. 
Europe is by far the most important trading partner of the Mediterranean Middle 
East (Tunisia and Turkey exchanging two-thirds of their foreign trade with the 
EU). Countries, like Egypt and Israel, import more from the United States, but the 
values of import and export summed together, the EU is their more significant 
partner.135 
In the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the EU has been trying to 
become the second main "referee" besides the United States. 
135
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The EU is the largest donor of non-military aid to the MEPP (some 179 
million euro [some $159 million] a year is given to the Palestinian Authority in 
direct support for the refugees).136 The EU's position on the MEPP, as a major 
global political and economic actor was at first officially expressed in the Venice 
Declaration in 1980 and reaffirmed by many subsequent meetings. 
The Arab states lost trust (if they ever had any) in the United States as the 
mediator in the Arab - Israeli peace process. The Arab states would like to see 
the EU more involved. The European problem, however, interrelated with the 
MEPP is that no clearly identifiable European position exists. Every European 
nation has its own political and economic stand in the Middle East. The EU 
countries still compete among themselves for influence and access to markets 
and for lucrative arms contracts. This is the major internal challenge for the EU - 
"to speak with one voice toward the "outside" world". 
A.       EUROPEAN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
VIS-A-VIS THE MIDDLE EAST 
Over the past half century, European countries have been building a 
successful system of European cooperation and integration. It started in 1952, 
when Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany 
formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
136
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The European Political Cooperation (EPC), the foreign policy instrument 
among members of the European Community, tried to demonstrate a more active 
posture toward the economical and political challenges from the Middle East 
region. This cooperation was the first European institution, which was exclusively 
related to foreign policy. Its purpose was to ensure mutual understanding among 
the member states and their solidarity on major international policy problems. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMPI) or, as it is also 
called the "Euro-Med" approach pursued by the European Union (EU) since 
1995, aims at promoting the overarching policy goals of "peace, stability and 
prosperity" through bilateral partnership agreements. The ambitious goal, which 
drives all actions attributed to the partnership, is a Euro - Mediterranean free 
trade zone being established by 2010. This area would constitute the biggest free 
trade area in the world, covering 600-800 million people in some 30-40 
countries.137 
On June 19, 2000, the European Council adopted a common strategy on 
the Mediterranean region: 'The Mediterranean region is of strategic importance 
to the EU. A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region, with an open 
perspective towards Europe, is in the best interests of the EU and Europe as a 
whole."138 
137 It would be the second largest, if the negotiations about the establishment of a 'Free Trade 
Area of the Americans' will succeed. Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, Arab Perceptions of the 
European Union's Euro - Mediterranean Projects, in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), Mediterranean 
Security Into the Coming Millennium, (Strategic Studies Institute 1999), p. 143 
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 Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region, 
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For the implementation of this common strategy the EU institutions and all 
member states' institutions are acting in accordance with the CFSP and the 
treaties attributed to it. 
1.       The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy was established with the 
Maastricht Treaty and came into force on November 1, 1993. The provisions of 
the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed on October 
2,1997139 and came into force on May 1,1999. 
The CFSP, strongly promoted by Bonn, was introduced as the result of a 
desire to better equip the Union for the many challenges it faces at the 
international level. This was accomplished by providing it with new means of 
taking action in areas of foreign relations other than the traditional community 
ones (mainly trade policy and development cooperation).140 With the CFSP, the 
European Union can make its voice heard on the international stage and express 
its position on armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject. The Treaty 
also provides the Union with a common security policy that covers all matters 
relating to its security, including the gradual formulation of a common defense 
policy. 
139
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The Common Foreign and Security Policy is not implemented in the same 
way as the other community policies (i.e. agricultural policy, environmental 
protection). Because of the sensitivity of issues related to the CFSP, the Treaty is 
implemented via the European Council. The European Council brings together 
the Heads of State or government of the fifteen member states of the European 
Union and the President of the European Commission.141 
At the meeting in Vienna in December 1998, the European Council agreed 
on the need for a representative to assist in policy formulation and 
implementation and act on behalf of the Council, when conducting political 
dialogue with third parties. The Council appointed Javier Solana as the High 
Representative for the CFSP. He receives additional support from "special 
representatives", who are appointed with a mandate related to particular policy 
issues for selected regions (Mr. Moratinos is the current special envoy for the 
Middle East). 
2.       The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) 
The security in the Mediterranean cannot be considered solely in military 
terms. Its political and economic dimensions must also be taken into account. 
The close connection between the political, economic, military and social aspects 
of security in the region are best served with a multilateral approach. 
141
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This concept fits perfectly with Berlin's general attitude to foreign policy. The 
recognition of these facts led to the Euro- Mediterranean Conference of fifteen 
EU members and twelve non-EU Mediterranean states, held in Barcelona on 
November 27-28 1995.142 
The Barcelona Process is centered around three issue areas: (1) political 
and security cooperation, (2) economic and financial cooperation, and (3) social, 
cultural and human cooperation. The process marked new strategic relationship 
going beyond the traditional areas of trade and economic cooperation. 
The three goals are 
• The creation of an area of peace and stability based on 
fundamental principles, including respect for human rights and 
democracy 
• The creation of an area of shared prosperity through progressive 
establishment of free trade between the EU and its partners and 
among the partners themselves in view of the creation of the 
wider Euro - Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. This process 
is accompanied by substantial financial support from the EU for 
economic transition to help partners deal with the social and 
economic challenges which come with transition. 
• The improvement of mutual understanding among the people of 
the region and the development of an active civil society.143 
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Financially, the partnership was supported with over nine billion euro 
(some $8 billion) from the common budget as well as loans from the European 
Investment Bank for the period of 1995 to 1999144; similar levels of annual 
commitments were approved in 1999 for a second phase (MEDA-II) from 2000 to 
2006. The Barcelona Declaration principles and aims are largely inspired by the 
model of cooperation and integration of the EU itself. Obviously, the evolution 
and implementation of policies and confidence-building measures take time and 
constitute long-term objectives. Until today, only a few concrete steps toward 
political implementation of the goals have been taken. 
The creation of a free trade zone, as the most important practical policy 
objective of the partnership, is regarded as a means to create sustainable 
growth, attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and, thus, achieve 
sustainable development in the countries of the region. Additionally, a social 
component is attached to the Barcelona Declaration in order to avoid possible 
political instability caused by negative impacts resulting from liberal economic 
reforms. 
The Barcelona Process is underpinned by a network of bilateral relations 
between each country and the EU, embodied in association agreements. The 
involved countries perceived this multilateral process very differently. Israel 
acknowledged the need to respond positively to the European proposal and 
signed, as the first country, the association agreement in 1995. 
144
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The Arab countries have generally accepted the principle of establishing a Euro - 
Mediterranean Partnership, however, there is severe criticisms of the process. 
Arab businessmen are concerned that the process will create a system of vertical 
cooperation between each Arab country and the EU, thereby threatening 
horizontal Arab cooperation.145 They also fear that the process will lead to an 
erosion of Arab indigenous industries because these companies are not able to 
compete with European industrial production. Further, the Arabs are reluctant to 
the proposal because they perceive the issue of elimination of weapons of mass 
destruction as a European focus on chemical and biological weapons, leaving the 
Israeli nuclear arsenal untouched.146 The Arab countries are, consequently, more 
or less reluctant and ambivalent partners in the Barcelona Process. 
3.       The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and 
Economic Aid 
The strategy of the Barcelona Process is the establishment of bilateral 
agreements with all Mediterranean partners. In 1994 the European Council 
declared that Israel, on account of its high level of economic development, should 
enjoy special status in its relations with the European Union on the basis of 
reciprocity and common interests. The association agreement establishes for the 
first time an institutional political dialogue between the EU and Israel. 
145Selim,p. 149 
146
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This represents a new development in the already very close relations, which 
existed between Israel and the EU. In addition to the political dialogue, the 
association agreement sets up a large number of areas for possible future co- 
operation. For example, in the field of economic cooperation, the agreement 
covers areas, such as industry, energy, information infrastructures and 
telecommunications, transport and tourism.147 
Further (interim) agreements are in force with Tunisia and Morocco; Egypt 
recently signed the partnership agreement and the agreement with Jordan has 
been signed but yet not ratified.148 Additionally, the EU has concluded an EU- 
PLO Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement for the benefit of the 
Palestinian Authority which entered into force on July 1,1997. 
The European Council has engaged Israel's leadership stressing the issue 
that Israel understands freedom of trade should be for all. Israel's cooperation is 
a key factor in achieving the effective inclusion of the Palestinians in the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership. The Palestinian Authority does not have an 
independent outlet for its exports. All its products must transit through Israel or 
through Israeli-controlled borders. 
147
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Palestinian trade is heavily concentrated on Israel: 90 percent on imports coming 
from Israel, 80 percent exports going to Israel.149 At times when Israel partially or 
totally close the borders to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, it prevents the 
Palestinian Authority from freely trading with world markets, including Europe, 
which is the second main source of its imports. 
The EU has given the Palestinians 256 million euro ($228 million) as aid in 
the period of 1995-1999. Since the end of November 2000, the EU has given 
some $52.5 million in emergency aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) because of 
the closure on the territories.150 Without this important economic contribution, the 
continuation of the peace process, even in its present difficult state, would not 
have been possible. 
From the European perspective a stalemate of the peace process 
threatens the Barcelona process. Financial aid has been given to trigger 
sufficient private sector investment flows into the region, thereby truly improving 
the economic standards of the people in the region, notably the Palestinians. The 
European Union's massive program of economic assistance seems not to have 
accomplished its goals. In fact, the opposite has happened: all Palestinian 
economic indicators point at a clear deterioration of living conditions.151 
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Whether the "Barcelona Process" will be a success is questionable. First, 
the fundamental disparity between the relatively successful economies and 
political systems in Europe and the less successful economies on the Southern 
borders of the Mediterranean (with the exception of Israel) creates a situation of 
tension between Christian Europe and the Muslim countries of the Middle East. 
This disparity makes it hard to establish an area of free trade and mutual 
understanding, based on same or similar values. Second, the U.S. was 
deliberately excluded from the Barcelona Process. The only linkage between the 
U.S. brokered peace negotiations and the Barcelona Process is an observer 
status for the High Representative (Mr. J. Solana) in the CFSP, assisted by his 
special envoy. The Barcelona Process strategy, however, is economic 
cooperation, followed by integration. The implementation of the Barcelona 
Process can only succeed in a conflict-free and stable environment. Therefore, 
the MEPP must be successful to a certain extent; at least an interim solution 
must be reached. 
B.       THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
The reasoning behind the European approach to the Middle East Peace 
Process is that economic growth brings political stability, which in terms creates a 
peaceful or, at least, a conflict-free environment in intra-state as well as inter- 
state relations. 
14.   Feb.   2001;   available   online,   <http://www.welt.de/daten/2001/02/15/0215eu222808.htx> 
(February 09 2001) 
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In this sense democratization is, "the peace-vehicle", understood as a factor that 
changes and reduces the role of the state in the economy, which gives way to 
liberalization and privatization. This development would facilitate regional 
cooperation and integration. The overall domestic and regional stabilization 
would subsequently strengthen the market economy, which allows capital 
entering the country from abroad in forms of FDI and new technologies. The 
ultimate stage in this process is across-the-border political, economic and social 
stability and equally distributed prosperity in legitimate governed countries. 
Whether this logical sequence will be successful is questionable. Israel 
has a consolidated democracy but a widely divided society. Yet, no consensus 
has been reached on the issue as how to achieve a peace agreement with the 
Palestinians. If a peace agreement is ever achieved, this will intensify the debate 
about what kind of state Israel is - a democratic (Jewish) state or a state for the 
Jews. Democratization plus liberalization in the Arab states would endanger the 
governing authoritarian regimes; therefore, these regimes would only open up the 
economy and introduce democratic trends as much as necessary to keep the 
people quiet and to maintain power. 
1.       European Union's Political Support to the Middle East Peace 
Process 
Until the early 1990s the European states have not played a major role in 
the Middle East neither as a crisis mediator nor as a peacemaker. 
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Europe has not aspired to a role like the two superpowers and has not been an 
important independent player in Middle Eastern geopolitics.152 This significantly 
changes with an increasingly unified Europe, with more influence on the world 
scene and with interests, security and stability directly affected by development in 
the nearby Middle East. 
On 19 April 1994, the European Council passed the declaration, "Common 
Campaign to Support the Middle Eastern peace process", with following 
elements, inter alias 
• Exertion of influence on all parties in support of the peace process 
and the consolidation of democracy and human rights 
• Development of the European role in multilateral labor groups of 
the peace process, especially 'arms control and regional security' 
as well as "development of regional economy" 
• Stronger influence in international committees in support of the 
Palestinians, i.e. the Ad-hoc Liaison Committee153 
The Middle East peace process was launched under joint US - Soviet Union co- 
sponsorship at the Madrid Conference in October 1991. It constituted the first 
comprehensive attempt to reach a just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict since 1948. The acting President of the Council of the EU, Hans van der 
Broek, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands declared 
...The Twelve [then EU member] consider... that the parties have 
committed themselves to... direct negotiations on the basis of 
resolutions 242 and 338... The political negotiations are to be 
underpinned by multilateral negotiations on regional cooperation in 
fields of mutual interests.... 
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The Twelve's guiding principles are those which have since long 
governed our position. These principles are Security Council 
resolution 242 and 338, the principle of land for peace, the right of all 
states in the region, including Israel, to live within secure and 
recognized boundaries and the proper expression of the right to self- 
determination of the Palestinian people. 
The Madrid Conference initiated two main processes, known as "bilateral talks" 
and the "multilateral track". The bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan led to a 
peace agreement signed in 1994; whereas, the present course of the Israeli - 
Palestinian talks took another direction. The idea of the multilateral track is based 
on the functionalist conception of international or multinational cooperation. The 
"track" is structured into five working areas: regional security and arms control, 
water, environment, refugees and economic development. The expectation is 
that the advantages of cooperation and mutual understanding in these "technical" 
less sensitive working areas would create a climate for agreements in security on 
"higher" political issues.155 
In order to overcome the political and perceptional difficulties in 
implementing the European role, the Council of the EU appointed Angel 
Moratinos as the special envoy to the Middle East Peace Process. His mandate 
is to assist the conflicting parties in their contacts as well as in their negotiations if 
and when requested; he also monitors violations by either party of existing 
agreements. 
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Since his appointment, the special envoy has engaged in continued contacts with 
all relevant regional and international players. This has enhanced the political 
role of the EU in the peace process, however, on a low profile.156 
One of the successes of the Euro - Mediterranean Partnership is that it 
allows a dialogue between all Mediterranean partners involved in the peace 
process. The partnership is the only multilateral forum outside the United Nations 
in which all conflicting parties meet. The EU succeeded in incorporating Syria into 
the Euro - Mediterranean program. Syria refused to participate in the multilateral 
working groups created at the Madrid Conference in 1991.157 
The Euro - Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, agreed on at a 
meeting of all 27 EMP Foreign Ministers in Stuttgart in 1999, set guidelines for all 
partners ensuring stability and peace in the region. This instrument is meant to 
function as a political binding document that prevents tension and crisis by 
means of cooperative security. It acts in accordance with the Barcelona 
Declaration and serves as an implementation tool where issues of peace and 
stability are concerned.158 
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However, this meeting of the foreign ministers is still a "talking platform" without 
an institutionalized character; no consensus on the establishment of joint actions 
on conflict prevention, crisis management and against terrorism has yet been 
reached. 
The EU promotes a just and lasting peace for the region. But because of 
the hegemonic stand of the United States in the region as well as in the peace 
process, the EU plays a political subordinate role. This aspect is incorporated in 
the Barcelona Declaration, clearly saying that the EU does not intend to interfere 
with the U.S. brokered peace negotiations. Europe is approaching the Middle 
East in economic terms. The principles of the Barcelona Process, the Madrid 
Conference and Europe's understanding of the peace process are close 
economic relations and cooperation followed by integration. The logic of this 
approach is that trade and cooperation underpin peace. A positive Palestinian 
economic development in this sense is considered as Israel's best long-term 
security guarantee. 
Europe's economic role in the peace process is essential for the 
continuation of negotiations, - for the Palestinian's economy it is even vital. 
However, the EU has not yet been able to develop an adequate political role in 
the peace process. The reasons are mainly (1) the United States' purpose and 
interest in maintaining the leadership in the process159 (2) the Israeli and Arab 
perceptions of the European role. 
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Israel, or better, the collective historical memory of the Jews, views 
Europe as representing a continent of anti-Semitism and pogroms. This view is 
underpinned by the European media's use of words, such as genocide, when 
describing Israeli behavior with respect to the Palestinians. The Arabs and 
Palestinians still perceive Europeans as the "conqueror" charging the Western 
countries (U.S., EU) with a double standard, because they punish Iraq much 
more heavily than Israel for not complying with UN Security Council 
resolutions.160 
Germany, in this context, has a crucial part. It is Israel's protegee in its 
dialogue with the EU. The Federal Republic plays an active role in expanding ties 
between Israel and the EU. During Germany's 1994 presidency, the foundation 
was laid for transforming the 1975 European - Israel agreement on cooperation 
into an association treaty, which went into force in June 2000. In Germany's 
second presidency in 1999, a treaty on scientific and technical cooperation went 
into effect. Former Israeli ambassador to Germany, Benjamin Navon, noted 
There is a positive consistency in Germany's attitude towards Israel 
in the European context; that is the special aspect of the 
relationship. It is Israel's experience - and expectation for the future 
- that Germany, as the European state most sympathetic to Israel's 
needs, interests and political objectives, will persist in this line.161 
160 Settlements built on occupied land are illegal under international law and have long been an 
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Both countries clearly benefit from the Israel - EU Association Agreement. 
Chancellor Schroeder declared that Israel has a key role to play in the relations 
between the EU and the Middle East. "For Germany, the relations between the 
EU and Israel must be universal and comprehensive. Our [Germany's] strategic 
task is the extension of these relations in all fields."162 Berlin's Israel-biased 
politics counterbalances Paris' pro-Arab orientated actions and removes Tel 
Aviv's fears about a European foreign policy that sides with the Arab states. 
162
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VI.     CONCLUSION 
Germany's new geostrategic position in Central Europe since re- 
unification offers new opportunities but it also creates new responsibilities. The 
Federal Republic needs to adopt a foreign policy, which reflects this situation. 
Over the years Bonn and Berlin's policy and decision-makers adopted a 
"pragmatic multilateral attitude" that serves the country's interests best. At first, 
forced by the allied powers who followed the concept of (re)building Germany's 
democratic institutions creating an "economic giant", but with the characteristics 
of a "political and militarily dwarf" as a bulwark against the communist threat. 
Later, this concept of a "civilian power" became self-sustainable and was 
incorporated in the German mind. "Supranationalism" and institutional 
cooperation, followed by integration are the key figures in Germany's formulation 
and representation of power and national interests. This "multilateral - 
institutional approach" served Germany well during the Cold War period and 
helped to postpone taking up national positions. 
Some observers feared that Germany as a unified state would take 
advantage of its new and powerful position in Central Europe, discard its strong 
support for European integration and embark on a unilateral foreign policy to 
expand its influence on the continent and into the world.163 But the Federal 
Republic adhered strongly to its integral approach; one example has been Bonn's 
strong support for the Maastricht Treaty. 
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The latest evidence is Chancellor Schroeder' s proposal for a "Federalist 
European Government" made in early May of this year.164 
In Germany's federalist democratic system, party politics, the power of 
interest groups and public opinion play a significant role not only in domestic 
politics, but also in foreign policy. Although the Federal Republic is a major 
economic power, it has not develop a strategic thinking like France, Great Britain 
or the United States. The countries' political elite continues to point out that 
Germans are seeking a post-national identity in the context of European 
integration and the Atlantic alliance. The perception of the country's security 
environment since the disintegration of the Soviet Union changed the values in its 
society. Military security is no longer a primary concern. Environmental security, 
civil liberty and quality of life have a greater priority than materialist values, such 
as economic growth and country security. 
What do these facts mean to the Federal Republic policy in the Middle 
East and what can be expected from its foreign policy, in general, and in the 
Middle East, in particular, in the foreseeable future? 
Germany has ceased to be a net exporter of goods, services and capital, 
and a net importer of security. Its broader perspective of security is a useful 
paradigm to counter the challenges in an increasingly interdependent world. 
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Germany's potential - its size, economic power and its position in Central 
Europe- makes it a major player in the international system. However, its political 
economy has a lot of constraints to deal with. (1) the costs of unification are 
much higher than estimated. Eastern Germany has not yet achieved the Western 
economic standards. (2) reforms in economics, the tax system, social welfare 
and the "Bundeswehr" are overdue in equipping the Federal Republic for future 
challenges. 
Finally, European unification and its enlargement to the East are also 
expected to be very costly "adventures". These "adventures" are from Berlin's 
perspective, however, essential for political and economic access to East 
European states and markets. Germany, today, is the biggest net-payer and will 
continue to be because it is the largest country West of Russia, with the highest 
GDP and it benefits most, politically and economically, from the enlargement. 
Sustainable economic development in the East European countries is very 
important for the German society; otherwise, the Federal Republic would be 
confronted with a mass influx of immigrants. 
Generally the Federal Republic foreign policy is somewhat ambiguous. On 
the one hand it undertakes small steps to formulate and express its national 
interests and likes to be viewed as a Great (civilian) Power, indirectly asking for a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council. On the other hand this foreign policy 
is not underpinned with an appropriate security policy and an attitude related to 
the responsibilities of a Great Power. Germany's defense expenditures, for 
example, are the second lowest in NATO. 
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For German politicians, however, it is not opportune to ask for higher spending 
on military equipment because, in the eyes of public opinion, government 
revenues should preferable be spend in other areas, like education, means to 
fight unemployment and environmental protection. 
In the MENA region, Berlin uses its new foreign policy concept "active 
economic presence" to exert political influence. It distinguishes itself from former 
Foreign Minister Genschers "Scheckbuch Diplomatie" in such a way that 
Germany offers economic support only for political service in return. This slight 
change in attitude has a twofold explanation. Now, the German leadership 
formulates national positions more clearly, based on the country's full 
sovereignty. Secondly, the cost of unification, essential reforms on economic and 
financial issues as well as the expected costs of Europe's integration and 
enlargement make it very difficult for the Federal Republic to continue its "old 
diplomacy". 
German policy toward the Middle East in the recent past has been defined 
in economic rather than political terms. As one of the largest industrial nations, 
Germany is dependent upon a stable and well-functioning economic system that 
is committed to free trade. As a large producer and the biggest exporter of 
manufacturing goods, but without its own sufficient resources, Germany has had 
to rely mainly on imported low-cost oil from the Middle East. On the other hand 
Germany had destroyed Europe's "old order" and killed some six million Jews. 
The legacy of the Third Reich atrocities created a moral obligation to the Jewish 
state and to the Jews worldwide. 
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These facts prevented a German independent Middle East policy in the sense of 
a Great or Medium Power. Germany's political encounter in the Middle East is a 
cautiously executed evenhanded approach, a kind of balancing-act between a 
historical pro-Israeli stand and a more economical dominated pro-Arab position. 
The Arab states view the Federal Republic as more of an honest mediator 
than the United States. Therefore they like to see a larger engagement of the 
Germans in the Middle East and in the MEPP, either in a unilateral approach or 
through an institutional framework like the EU. 
Israel' s attitude in this context is twofold; first, Israel's leadership knows 
that for achieving its political goals it can rely foremost on the United States who 
sides with the Israelis because of the domestic impact of its Jewish and Israeli 
lobby. Second, Israel views itself more as a European-style state than as a 
Middle Eastern state. Tel Aviv has great interest in firm economic relations with 
Brussels. In this context the Federal Republic plays an active part in expanding 
ties between Israel and the EU. It is Israel's protegee in its dialogue with the EU. 
Berlin's Israel-biased politics counterbalances Paris' pro-Arab orientated actions 
and calms Tel Aviv's fears about a European foreign policy that sides with the 
Arab states. 
Although the moral obligation to the Jewish state changed in quality over 
time, normalcy in Jewish - German relations is not yet possible. The younger 
generation of politicians in both states, however, are able to differentiate between 
the Holocaust and "businesslike Realpolitik". Critiques on Israel's policy toward 
the Palestinians has nothing to do with anti-Semitism. 
103 
Within German politics and society there is a sympathetic trend in terms of the 
"Palestinian question". Some politicians and intellectuals view Israel as the 
"regional hegemon", which had occupied the territories in the 1967 War. 
Germany's general policy is to fight violations of human rights and international 
law, this includes Israeli actions against the people in the West Bank and Gaza. 
The political results of these aspects are a more of a indifferent picture of 
Israel and a change in political activities. The implications on politics in the Middle 
East will be that Germany's future leadership generations are focused on 
economic and other "real" interests rather than on an explicitly Israel-biased 
policy. How soon this will happen depends inter alias on Israel's politics. It is an 
open secret that Germany's politicians are more in favor of the universalistic, 
secular-orientated, inclusive politics of a Labor-led government than with the 
particularistic, national- orientated, exclusive politics of the current governing 
Likud-led coalition. 
Will Berlin be more decisive in its foreign policy actions toward the Middle 
East? I doubt it. I do not go as far as Josef Joffe, saying that ideally, the Federal 
Republic would prefer to have "no policy" in the Middle East,165 but Germany has 
learned to appreciate the low costs associated with acting as a "political dwarf" 
while achieving its economic goals. Why should Berlin enter a " political 
minefield" and engage decisively in the Middle East Peace Process when even 
the remaining superpower nation does not have the capacity or the political will to 
solve the Arab - Israeli dispute. 
165
 Joffe, p. 205 
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Even when Germany does not clearly expressed its national interests, in recent 
years, its evenhanded attitude in the Middle East has been appreciated in both 
conflicting parties: in the Arab states and in the PA as well as in Israel. It has for 
the most part also reached its aim - fulfilling the economic interests even when 
critics call it "muddling through".166 Furthermore it is expected that with the 
European enlargement and the subsequently discovery of new markets and 
sources to fulfill its energy needs, i.e. oil and gas in the Caspian Sea, Germany 
would rather turn Eastward instead of Southward. So why engage in an instable 
region with political, economic and social unrest when securing its energy needs 
is, to a certain extent possible elsewhere?, there are not many gains. 
As a European country, the Federal Republic, however, has to take a stance in 
the MENA region because the challenges and risks related to this region can only 
be solved or, better said, can only be encountered in the European context. In 
sum, there might be some more small steps undertaken by the Federal Republic 
plainly expressing its national interests, but they will surely be embedded in the 
European network rather than formulated unilaterally. Germany will continue its 
multilateral, evenhanded attitude toward the Middle East, swinging between the 
moral obligation to the State ofjsrael and the security of its energy needs, while 
continuing to be reluctant in using military force and further pursuing its national 
and economic interests through a interrelated European and trans-Atlantic 
framework. 
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 For example, Thomas Risse-Kappen in his chapter in Germany and the Middle East, edited by 
Sharam Chubin 
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